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I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of professional speech is one of the least developed
areas of First Amendment doctrine. The few judicial decisions that have
addressed limitations on professional speech have failed to provide a
comprehensive analytical framework for defining the limits on such
regulation.1 Moreover, there is little consensus in the academic literature
regarding the proper approach to the issue.
2
t Partner, Clifford Chance US LLP. The author wishes to thank Suzanne R. Garment for her valu-
able editorial assistance. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author, as are any errors
or omissions.
I. See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); Lowe v.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 946 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The Exceptionalism of Doctor-
Patient Speech within the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX
153 (1998); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 792-828 (1999); Robert Kry, The "Watchman
for Truth ": Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 957-63
(2000); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 404-23
(2001); Kathy S. Pomerantz, Note, "Silence is a Fence Around Wisdom ". How Conant v. Walters
Broke Down the Fence by Securing Physicians' First Amendment Right to Recommend Medical
Marijuana to their Patients, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1771 (2004); Jessica Russak Sharpe, Recent De-
velopments, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez: Tightening the Noose on Patients' Rights, 81 N.C.
L. REV. 1312 (2003); Maria Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney
Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202 (2003). The professional speech doctrine can be viewed as one
variant of a more generalized "hearer-centered" First Amendment theory that includes the doctrines
of commercial speech. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579 (2004); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government
Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1989); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 53 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Gener-
allv Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances, " and the Un-
charted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005). There has been a considerable amount of
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This Article examines First Amendment limitations on the regula-
tion of professional speech in the context of recent "Circular 230" regu-
lations, which govern the content and presentation of opinions and other
written tax advice ("tax opinions") concerning transactions that have a
significant or principal purpose of avoiding federal taxes or are otherwise
deemed to be tax avoidance transactions.3 Although these regulations
apply broadly to "practitioners" before the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS),4 this Article focuses on the application of the regulations to law-
yers.
The Circular 230 regulations require a tax opinion to meet a strict
set of requirements. The opinion must identify and evaluate all facts
relevant to the transaction.5 It must relate all applicable law to the facts.6
It generally must identify and evaluate each "significant Federal tax is-
sue," meaning a federal tax issue that meets a materiality threshold and
to which the IRS has a "reasonable basis" for a successful challenge.7
The opinion may not contain internally inconsistent legal analyses or
conclusions, 8 nor may it take into account the possibility that the IRS
might not audit a tax return or raise an issue on audit, or might resolve
the issue by settlement if raised. 9 The opinion must conclude whether the
overall tax treatment of the transaction is proper.'0 If someone other than
the practitioner will use or refer to the opinion to promote, market, or
recommend (collectively, "to market") a transaction (a "marketed opin-
ion"), the opinion must conclude that the taxpayer will prevail on each
significant federal tax issue affecting the transaction, and that the overall
tax treatment is proper, at a confidence level of at least "more likely than
scholarship applying such principles to the regulation of speech in the capital markets. See Lillian R.
Bevier, A Comment on Professor Wolfson 's "The First Amendment and the SEC," 20 CONN. L. REV.
325 (1988); Allen D. Boyer, Free Speech, Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 474 (1992) (reviewing NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND
THE SEC (1990)); Michael P. Dooley, The First Amendment and the SEC: A Comment, 20 CONN. L.
REV. 335 (1988); Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77 (1989); Michael E. Schoeman, The First Amendment and Re-
strictions on Advertising of Securities under the Securities Act of 1933, 41 BuS. LAW. 377 (1986);
Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265 (1988).
3. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35, 10.37 (2006) (For ease of reference, all C.F.R. Sections on this topic
will, in this Article, be identified first as Circular 230). The regulations fall within Treasury Dept.
Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10.
4. Practitioners are defined for this purpose to include attorneys, certified public accountants,
"enrolled agents," and "enrolled actuaries." 31 C.F.R. § 10.2 (2006).
5. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1) (2006).
6. Id. § 10.35(c)(2).
7. Id. § 10.35(c)(3), (b)(3).
8. Id. § 10.35(c)(2)(iii).
9. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(iii).
10. Id. § 10.35(c)(4).
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not."" Any non-marketed opinion that doesn't express this level of con-
fidence with respect to an issue must prominently disclose that the writer
did not intend or write it to be used to avoid tax penalties, and that the
taxpayer may not use it for this purpose (a "no reliance" legend).' 2 A
marketed opinion must prominently disclose that the opinion was written
to support the promotion or marketing of the transaction and that the tax-
payer should seek advice, based on the taxpayer's particular circum-
stances, from an independent tax advisor (a "consumer protection" leg-
end).' 3 The tax opinion must disclose any compensation arrangement the
practitioner has with a third party for marketing the transaction, and any
referral agreement with a third party who markets such a transaction.'
4
The rules prohibit a practitioner from providing advice that is contrary to
or inconsistent with a required disclosure.' 5
The Circular 230 regulations allow tax opinions that meet certain
conditions to avoid these requirements, generally or as to specific issues,
by including a "no reliance" legend.' 6 Certain marketed opinions can
avoid these requirements by including both a "no reliance" legend and a
"consumer protection" legend.' 7 However, only limited categories of tax
opinions can benefit from such exceptions. A practitioner cannot use the
"no reliance" legend to avoid the Circular 230 requirements if an opinion
addresses a so-called "listed transaction,' 8 has as its principal purpose
the avoidance or evasion of taxes, is a marketed opinion, or is subject to
certain "conditions of confidentiality" or "contractual protection" for the
taxpayer.' 9 Opinions that are excepted from these rules still must satisfy
certain requirements regarding factual due diligence, and may not take
into account the possibility that the IRS will not audit a tax return or raise
an issue on audit, or will resolve the issue through settlement if it is
raised.2 °
The Circular 230 requirements are intended to address the signifi-
cant policy and budgetary issue of practitioners' involvement in the de-
velopment, marketing and encouragement of abusive tax shelters. 2I Pro-
fessionals connected with these abusive shelters certainly have acted in-
I. Id. § 10.35(b)(5)(i), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(4)(ii).
12. Id. § 10.35(e)(4).
13. Id. § 10.35(e)(2).
14. Id. § 10.35(e)(1).
15. Id. § 10.35(e)(5).
16. Id. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(v).
17. Id. § 10.35(b)(5)(ii).
18. Listed transactions are discussed in more detail infra notes 49-55.
19. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i) (2006).
20. Id. § 10.37.
21. See, e.g., Department of the Treasury, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed.
Reg. 30,375 (May 11, 2000).
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appropriately in some cases, 2 but the Circular 230 requirements are in
many respects an inappropriate response to these problems. The frame-
work and prohibitions they impose prevent a lawyer from giving taxpay-
ers a complete, informed assessment of their rights. In certain circum-
stances, the rules create significant ethical conflicts and deny the public
legal advice. In general, they distort the lawyer's role and erode the prin-
ciples underlying legal ethics rules. The restriction of information and
distortion of a lawyer's role make the rules vulnerable to a First Amend-
ment challenge under the doctrines of professional speech and, in the
case of opinions used to market tax shelters to third parties, under a gen-
eral "hearer-centered" First Amendment theory.
Part II of this Article discusses the background, scope, and re-
quirements of the Circular 230 rules. Part III discusses the ethical rules
applicable to tax opinions, compares these rules to the Circular 230 opin-
ion standards, and concludes that the Circular 230 standards impose sub-
stantially greater requirements on practitioners than, and in certain re-
spects conflict with, the ethical rules. Part IV discusses First Amendment
case law and commentary regarding professional speech, and proposes
that professional speech regulations be analyzed by a model that defines
permissible regulation of professional speech by reference to the role of
the profession in society and accepted professional norms. Part IV also
discusses the professional speech doctrine in the context of a more gen-
eral "hearer-centered" First Amendment theory, which is relevant in
evaluating the restrictions on professional opinions used to market tax
shelters to third parties. Part V applies the professional speech model and
the "hearer-centered" theory to the Circular 230 tax opinion require-
ments, and concludes that the "viewpoint-neutral" standards imposed by
Circular 230, while perhaps furthering the legitimate government pur-
pose of ensuring that taxpayers not enter into tax-motivated transactions
without a full understanding of the risks, are not narrowly tailored to
their purpose and distort the normal functioning of the profession based
on accepted usage. Part V also concludes that the "viewpoint-based"
standards imposed by Circular 230 are even less justified in terms of fur-
thering a legitimate government purpose, and more seriously distort the
role of a lawyer and interfere with the exercise of professional judgment.
22. For criticism of practitioner conduct relating to tax shelters, see James M. Delaney, Where
Ethics Merge with Substantive Law-An Analysis of Tax Motivated Transactions, 38 IND. L. REV.
295 (2005); Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43 (2001); Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Pro-
fessionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX NOTES 201 (2004); Jay A. Soled, Third-Party Civil Tax Penal-
ties and Professional Standards, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1611, 1650-53 (2004). For a more balanced
view, see Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775
(1999).
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Finally, Part V considers what requirements the government could le-
gitimately impose on tax opinions under the "professional speech" model
and, in the case of opinions used to market tax shelters, under the
"hearer-centered" theory.
1I. CIRCULAR 230 OPINION RULES
A. History of the Circular 230 Opinion Standards
The Treasury Department (Treasury) has regulated lawyers and
others practicing before the Department and its bureaus since before the
modern income tax. 23 Although Circular 230 regulated aspects of tax
advice for many years, Treasury's authority to regulate the content of tax
advice had been questioned.24 That question was addressed, however, by
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,5 which amended the current
authorizing statute, 31 U.S.C. Section 330, to specifically authorize
Treasury to impose standards for written advice with respect to entities,
plans or arrangements having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.
26
Treasury first adopted rules regulating the content and presentation
of tax shelter opinions in 1984, in former Section 10.33 of Circular 230.27
Former Section 10.33 was directed primarily to the problem of heavily
qualified, hypothetical, inconclusive or incorrect opinions which promot-
ers used to market tax shelters. 28 The preamble to the 1984 rules de-
scribed the problem as follows:
The theory of the tax shelter promoter appears to be that the tax
opinion, even if qualified or simply incorrect, may provided [sic]
the investor with assurance that penalties will not be assessed...
Moreover, promoters also appear to hope that investors will view
23. See Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, § 3, 23 Stat. 22.
24. ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS REGARDING PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
REGULATIONS GOVERNING PRACTICE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE 17 n.5, (Apr. 23, 2001),
reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (May 3, 2001); Letter from N. Jerold Cohen, American College of
Tax Counsel, to Richard W. Skillman, Acting Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, in TAX
NOTES TODAY (May 23, 2001).
25. Pub. L. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
26. 31 U.S.C. § 330(d) provides that "[n]othing in this section or in any other provision of law
shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to impose standards applica-
ble to the rendering of written advice with respect to any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or
other plan or arrangement, which is of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential
for tax avoidance or evasion."
27. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled
Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (Feb. 23,
1984). Treasury considered such rules to be authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 330 as then in effect, as well
as other statutory provisions. 49 Fed. Reg. 6720, 6721 (Feb. 23, 1984).
28. Department of the Treasury, Proposed Rule, Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Internal
Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, 58,595 (Sept. 4, 1980).
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the practitioner's willingness to provide an opinion, even when the
opinion is frankly pessimistic.., or simply does not purport to ad-
dress key tax aspects, as an endorsement of the tax shelter.29
The 1984 rules generally defined a "tax shelter" as an investment
having specific federal income or excise tax savings attributes as a sig-
nificant and intended feature. 30 A "tax shelter opinion" was defined as
"advice by a practitioner concerning the Federal tax aspects of a tax shel-
ter either appearing or referred to in the offering materials, or used or
referred to in connection with sales promotion efforts, and directed to
persons other than the client who engaged the practitioner to give the
advice.",31 Accordingly, a tax shelter opinion did not include "rendering
advice solely to the offeror. . . so long as neither the name of the practi-
tioner, nor the fact that a practitioner has rendered advice ... is referred
to in the offering materials or in connection with the sales promotion ef-
forts.
32
The 1984 rules required a practitioner who provided a tax shelter
opinion to (1) identify, describe, and analyze relevant facts, (2) relate the
law to the facts, (3) identify and assess material tax issues, and (4) pro-
vide an overall evaluation whether an investor will realize the material
tax benefits.
33
In the preamble to the proposed former rules, Treasury emphasized
that the rules would not "affect or regulate the practitioner's relationship
with individual clients," and that it was "the use of a tax shelter opinion
that the proposed rule would regulate, not the rendering of an opinion by
a lawyer to his client." 34 The preamble also stated that the proposed rules
were consistent with a 1982 American Bar Association opinion concern-
ing tax shelter opinions, Formal Opinion 346.35 After final publication of
Formal Opinion 346, the regulations were revised to conform more
closely to the ABA opinion. 36 "The legal profession," as Treasury de-
scribed the relationship, "has, by publication of ABA Opinion 346, rec-
ognized that attorneys have unique ethical responsibilities when they
render tax shelter opinions to persons who are not their clients. This ac-
29. Id.
30. Former Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(c)(2) (1984).
31. Id. § 10.33(c)(3).
32. Id.
33. Id. §§ 10.33(a)(1)-(3), (5).
34. Proposed Rules of the Department of the Treasury, Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,144, 56,146 (Dec. 15, 1982).
35. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) [hereinafter
Formal Opinion 346]. Formal Opinion 346 was originally issued on June 1, 1981, but after criticism
by tax practitioners, it was withdrawn and reissued in revised form on January 29, 1982.
36. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (Feb. 23, 1984).
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tion by the ABA reinforces Treasury's belief that tax practitioners must
meet minimum standards of conduct with respect to tax shelter opin-
* ,,37ions.
On May 11, 2000, Treasury published an advance notice of pro-
posed rulemaking that requested comments about the standards for pro-
viding tax advice and, in particular, whether the standards for tax shelter
opinions should be extended to opinions not used to market tax shelters,
including those used to establish a "reasonable cause and good faith"
exception to accuracy-related penalties.38 The notice stated that practitio-
ners and professional organizations had recommended a revision of Cir-
cular 230 to raise the standards for such advice.39 On January 12, 2001,
after receiving public comments, Treasury proposed revisions to the rules
for marketed tax shelters and new rules for all tax shelter opinions, in-
cluding opinions rendered to clients, that conclude that an issue will be
resolved in favor of a taxpayer at a level of confidence of "more likely
than not" or higher.4 ° Many of the present Circular 230 opinion standards
appeared in some form in the 2001 proposed rules and the proposed revi-
sions that followed in 2003.
The 2001 proposed rules revised the definition of a "tax shelter" to
incorporate the definition then found in Section 6662(d)(2)(C)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code (the Code):
4 1
For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "tax shelter" means-
(1) a partnership or other entity,
(1I) any investment plan or arrangement, or
(Ill) any other plan or arrangement,
if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or ar-
rangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.
42
As discussed in greater detail below, this technical definition of a "tax
shelter" covers far more than what is typically thought of as a tax shel-
ter.43
37. Id. at 6719-20.
38. Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,375, 30,376 (May 11, 2000).
39. Id. at 30,375.
40. Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 3276, 3279-81 (Jan. 12, 2001). On December 30, 2003,
Treasury withdrew the 2001 proposed rules and issued new proposed rules setting forth "best prac-
tices" for providing advice or assisting clients in the preparation of submissions to the IRS. 68 Fed.
Reg. 75,186, 75,187 (Dec. 30, 2003).
41. Currently, 1.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii).
42. The 2003 proposed rules adopted a definition of "tax shelter" similar to the definition in
I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2), but expanded the definition to cover all taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue
Code, not just the Federal income tax.
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On December 20, 2004, Treasury published final rules that address,
among other things, best practices for tax advisors, requirements for
"covered opinions," requirements for other written advice, and proce-
dures to ensure compliance.44 Treasury published corrections to the final
rules on April 14, 2005, 45 and further revisions on May 19, 2005.46 On
December 20, 2004, Treasury published proposed rules applying the Cir-
cular 230 opinion standards to state and local bond opinions, which are
excluded from the general requirements,4 7 and on June 7, 2005, the IRS
issued interim guidance regarding the definition of a state or local bond
opinion.48
B. The Current Circular 230 Opinion Standards
There are four significant components to the current rules: (1) a
definition of "covered opinions" that are subject to specific standards; (2)
the specific standards, including due diligence, analysis and presentation
requirements for different categories of covered opinions; (3) disclosures
required to accompany covered opinions; and (4) due diligence and
analysis standards for written advice other than covered opinions.
1. Covered Opinions
Opinions on certain types of transactions are per se covered opin-
ions, with limited exceptions. These transactions include so-called "listed
transactions" and transactions whose principal purpose is to avoid or
evade tax ("principal purpose transactions"). 49 In contrast, opinions on
transactions in which avoiding or evading tax is merely a significant pur-
pose ("significant purpose" transactions) are covered opinions only if
they do not fit within an exception and (a) involve such conditions as
confidentiality or contractual protection which suggest that the underly-
ing transactions are tax shelters; (b) are marketed opinions; or (c) express
a conclusion at a confidence level of "more likely than not" or higher (a
43. As pointed out by numerous commentators, the "significant purpose" definition covers
almost any transaction that results in tax savings, including many common business transactions and
well-accepted tax planning strategies. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Effects ofAnti-Tax-Shelter Rules
on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 109 TAx NOTES 915, 918 (2005).
44. Rules and Regulations, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Be-
fore the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839, 75,840-41 (Dec. 20, 2004).
45. Rules and Regulations, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Be-
fore the Internal Revenue Service; Correction, 70 Fed. Reg. 19,892 (Apr. 15, 2005).
46. Rules and Regulations, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Be-
fore the Internal Revenue Service, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824 (May 19, 2005).
47. Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,887 (Dec. 20, 2004).
48. I.R.S. Notice 2005-47; 2005-26 I.R.B. 1.
49. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B).
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"reliance" opinion).5 ° Within these broad categories are numerous spe-
cific definitions and exceptions.
a. Opinions on Listed and Principal Purpose Transactions
i. Listed Transactions
Listed transaction opinions concern any federal tax issue arising
from (1) a transaction that the IRS has identified in published guidance
(i.e., listed) as a tax avoidance transaction, or (2) a transaction substan-
tially similar to a listed transaction. 5 A listed transaction is per se a "re-
portable transaction., 52 That is, participants in the transaction are subject
to tax shelter reporting obligations,53 and "material advisors" to the
transaction are subject to reporting and record-keeping (so-called "list
maintenance") obligations. 4 The IRS views a "listed transaction" as a
hard-core abusive tax shelter. At times, however, it can be difficult to
identify a listed transaction. The definition of a listed transaction in-
cludes "substantially similar" transactions to those the IRS has listed.
55
The tax shelter reporting rules add only that a transaction is "substan-
tially similar" to an identified listed transaction if the two are factually
similar or based on the same or similar tax strategies and are expected to
have the same or similar tax consequences. 56 There is no further guid-
ance on the required degree of similarity; commentators have noted the
difficulty of making this assessment.57
ii. Principal Purpose Transactions
An opinion on a principal purpose transaction is written advice
concerning any federal tax issue arising from an entity, plan, or arrange-
ment, the principal purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any
tax the Code imposes. 58 In this context, a purpose is "principal" if it is
more important than any other purpose. 59 "Avoidance" and "evasion" are
not defined. Treasury apparently intended that the terms be interpreted
50. Id. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C).
51. Id. § 10.35(b)(2)(A) (2006).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2003).
53. See id.
54. I.R.C. §§ 6111-6112 (2005).
55. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(A) (2006).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4) (2003).
57. See, e.g., American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Comments Concerning Notice
2004-80 (Interim Guidance Under LR.C. §§ 6111, 6112 and 6708) (Feb. 7, 2005), reprinted in TAX
NOTES TODAY (Feb. 9, 2005).
58. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(B) (2006).
59. Id. § 10.35(b)(10).
Seattle University Law Review
consistently with their use in the "tax shelter" definition in Code Section
6662(d)(2)(C). However, neither Section 6662(d)(2)(C) nor the associ-
ated regulations define the terms. Federal tax rules generally define "eva-
sion" as reduction of taxes through unlawful means and "avoidance" as
reduction of taxes through lawful (or arguably lawful) means.60 Thus, the
IRS may consider even lawful planning or activities to minimize taxes as
"avoidance."61
The definition of a principal purpose transaction contains an excep-
tion for an entity, plan or arrangement whose principal purpose is to
claim benefits "in a manner consistent with the statute and Congressional
,,62purpose. However, there are no clear standards for determining when
a claim of tax benefits is consistent with the statute and Congressional
purpose, though the exception does not appear to apply where there is
any meaningful uncertainty that the tax benefits in question are available.
63 Finally, weighing the relative importance of the tax and non-tax pur-
poses of a transaction to determine whether the principal purpose is
avoidance of tax can be difficult, especially where the facts are not fully
known.64
iii. Covered Opinion Standards for Listed
and Principal Purpose Transactions
The covered opinion standards of Section 10.35 apply with special
rigor to opinions on listed and principal purpose transactions. The stan-
dards apply regardless of whether the opinion is used in marketing or the
level of confidence it expresses.65 Section 10.35 provides no opportunity
to exclude such an opinion from coverage by adding a "no reliance" leg-
end ("legending out").
The justification for this rigor cannot be to regulate opinions used
for marketing purposes, as was the case with former Section 10.33, be-
cause the present Section 10.35 covers more than marketed opinions. Nor
60. See BORIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS 4.3.2 (1999).
61. But see BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF
TAX PRACTICE § 208.2 (6th ed. 2004) (arguing, on the basis of the legislative history of Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1977 and the purpose of the tax shelter definition under Code Section 6662, that not
every corporate decision involving reduction of tax liability is avoidance).
62. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2006).
63. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans, Diana S.C. Zeydel & Tracy L. Bentley,
Circular 230 Redux: Questions of Validity and Compliance, 107 TAX NOTES 1533, 1539-40 (2005).
64. In this regard, the covered opinion rules differ from the penalty and tax shelter reporting
and document retention rules. For the latter purpose, the determination of whether a tax return posi-
tion falls within the rules generally is made after the transaction has been completed.
65. As discussed below, there is an exception for "negative advice," but it applies only where
the opinion does not reach a conclusion favorable to the taxpayer at any confidence level.
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can the justification be to regulate opinions used to avoid penalties. A
"no reliance" legend could satisfy such needs, but the rule does not allow
"legending out." Further, the rule covers opinions that could not be, or in
fact are not, used for penalty protection purposes. Treasury apparently is
of the view that listed and principal purpose transactions threaten the tax
system, and therefore should be subject to strictures similar to those for
marketed opinions.
It is true that taxpayers have used many listed and principal purpose
transactions to avoid taxes improperly or evade taxes. 66 The propagation
of such transactions undoubtedly threatens the tax system by creating
false justifications for taxpayers that wish to misreport their tax liabili-
ties. However, the mere fact that a transaction is a listed or principal pur-
pose transaction does not necessarily mean that it reduces taxes improp-
erly. Few court cases have adjudicated the merits of listed transactions,but the courts have upheld any number of transactions that would most
likely qualify as principal purpose transactions. 67 If courts rule that a
transaction provides valid tax savings, it is hard to call it a threat to the
tax system; if Congress and Treasury conclude otherwise, they have au-
thority to change the applicable statutes and regulations.
Even if no court has ruled on the validity of a given listed or princi-
pal purpose transaction, all listed transactions, and many principal pur-
pose transactions, are so-called "reportable transactions," which must be
reported to the IRS.6 8 If the IRS successfully challenges a transaction, it
can impose penalties under Code Section 6662A unless the taxpayer can
show, under very stringent standards, reasonable cause for the position
and good faith.69 While challenging such transactions places administra-
tive burdens on the IRS and subjects the agency to litigation risks, such
costs are inevitable in regulating a complex federal system subject to the
ultimate interpretive authority of the courts.7 °
Even assuming, arguendo, that listed and principal purpose transac-
tions are an inherent threat to the tax system, it is not obvious that the
threat justifies requiring a comprehensive opinion in every case. A prac-
titioner normally will have a duty to alert a client that such transactions
66. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, THE SETTLEMENT
INITIATIVE FOR INVESTORS IN A VARIETY OF BOND AND OPTION SALES STRATEGIES WAS
SUCCESSFUL AND SURFACED POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FOR CURTAILING ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS
(Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/
200630065fr.html.
67. See, e.g., Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Compaq Computer
Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (2003).
69. I.R.C. § 6664(d) (2005).
70. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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have risks, including a fight with the IRS, but these risks can be identi-
fied without a comprehensive opinion.
Applying the covered opinion standards to every piece of written
advice on a listed or principal purpose transaction will increase the cost
of the practitioner's advice. Also, some practitioners may be reluctant to
give any written advice, for fear of inadvertently violating the require-
ments. Treasury may view such consequences as salutary means of dis-
couraging listed and principal purpose transactions. However, discourag-
ing lawyers' advice is not an appropriate way to discourage such transac-
tions, whose validity depends on the facts of each case.
b. Opinions on Significant Purpose Transactions
Opinions on significant purpose transactions are written advice
concerning any federal tax issue arising from an entity, plan or arrange-
ment a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any
tax imposed by the Code, if the written advice is (1) subject to "condi-
tions of confidentiality" or "contractual protection"; (2) a "reliance opin-
ion"; or (3) a "marketed opinion.",71 The rules do not provide standards
for determining whether a significant purpose transaction exists. How-
ever, the history, drafting, and purpose of the rules clearly indicate that
they incorporate the standards used in Code Section 6662(d)(2)(C) to
define a tax shelter.7 2
i. Opinions Subject to "Conditions of Confidentiality"
or "Contractual Protection"
In general, an opinion is considered subject to conditions of confi-
dentiality if the practitioner seeks to impose restrictions on the disclosure
of the tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction for the purpose of
maintaining the confidentiality of the practitioner's tax strategies.73 An
opinion is considered subject to contractual protection if the taxpayer is
entitled to a refund of fees if all or part of the intended tax consequences
addressed in the opinion are not sustained, or if the fees are contingent on
the taxpayer's realization of tax benefits from the transaction.74
71. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C) (2006).
72. Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186, 75,188 (Dec. 30, 2003). Section 10.35 as proposed
in 2003 used the term "tax shelter opinions" and defined "tax shelter" by reference to significant
purpose transactions.
73. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(6) (2006).
74. Id. § 10.35(b)(7). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)-(4) (substantially similar lan-
guage).
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Opinions on significant purpose transactions that are given under
these circumstances are treated as per se tax shelter opinions and subject
to the opinion standards in Section 10.35, regardless of whether they are
used in marketing and regardless of their level of confidence. 75 Presuma-
bly, the rationale for such rigorous application of the rule is that the tax
practitioner should be viewed under these circumstances as promoting
the significant purpose transaction, just as with a marketed opinion.
However, these types of opinions do not receive fully parallel treatment.
"Legending out" is allowed for marketed opinions,76 but not for "confi-
dentiality" and "contractual protection" opinions; a limited scope opin-
ion, as discussed below, is allowed for "confidentiality" and "contractual
protection" opinions but not for marketed opinions.77 The reason for
these differences is not obvious.
ii. Marketed Opinions
An opinion "is a marketed opinion if the practitioner knows or has
reason to know that the written advice will be used or referred to by a
person other than the practitioner (or a person associated with the practi-
tioner's firm) in ... marketing ... an entity, investment plan or arrange-
ment to one or more taxpayers." 78 A practitioner is permitted to exclude
an opinion (other than a listed transaction or principal purpose opinion)
from this category by including a "no reliance" legend and a "consumer
protection" legend.79 A marketed opinion that is not excluded neverthe-
less must include a "consumer protection" legend.8 °
One problem with the rules lies in their lack of specific guidance on
what constitutes the marketing of an entity, plan or arrangement. The
2001 proposed rules included the statement that it is irrelevant whether
such activities are conducted publicly or privately.8 1 However, there has
been no guidance as to whether a person may be viewed as a promoter
even if not acting in the customary role of a shelter promoter. In many
situations, a client engages one practitioner to provide advice regarding
the tax treatment of a significant purpose transaction and another profes-
sional advisor for other aspects of the transaction. If the tax practitioner
knows that the client is sharing the practitioner's opinion with the other
advisor, and the other advisor refers to the tax opinion in recommending
75. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C) (2006).
76. Id. § 10.35(b)(5).
77. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A)(2).
78. Id. § 10.35(b)(5)(i).
79. Id. § 10.35(b)(5)(ii).
80. Id. § 10.35(e)(2).
8 1. Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 3276, 3280 (Jan. 12, 2001).
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that the client engage in the transaction, the tax opinion could be treated
as a marketed opinion that must include the legend for marketed opin-
ions. Yet, in this circumstance, the part of the legend stating that the
opinion was written to support the marketing of the transaction will not
be correct,82 the statement that the taxpayer should seek advice from an
independent tax advisor makes no sense, and the statement that the client
may not rely on the opinion to avoid penalties may not be correct, par-
ticularly if the opinion reaches conclusions at a "more likely than not"
level of confidence.
These illogical results strongly suggest that the definition of a mar-
keted opinion should be limited to opinions (or parts of opinions) that
address the tax treatment of a person other than the practitioner's client.
The absence of such a limitation may reflect a concern that the limitation
would allow practitioners working with promoters to avoid the rules by
rendering opinions to the promoter's clients and claiming that such per-
sons are clients of the practitioner. However, even assuming that a valid
attorney-client relationship exists, 83 this concern could have been ad-
dressed more narrowly by defining a marketed opinion to include an
opinion on a transaction rendered by a practitioner to a client for the pur-
pose of facilitating the marketing of the transaction by a third party.
Another problem with the rules lies in their ambiguous definition of
a marketed transaction. Consider the common situation in which a client
is negotiating an acquisition and asks a practitioner for written advice
regarding the tax treatment of the transaction to the client's counterparty.
If the practitioner knows or has reason to know that the client will use or
refer to the advice in connection with the negotiation, the opinion would
appear to constitute a marketed opinion, unless there is an election to
"legend out" the opinion.
One could avoid such situations by distinguishing opinions directed
only to the client and not used in marketing materials from opinions di-
rected to a third party or incorporated in marketing materials provided to
the third party. It is difficult to see why the former should be treated as a
marketed opinion.
84
Presumably, Treasury had two reasons for not creating such an ex-
ception. First, there may have been a concern, even where advice is ad-
82. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A) (1980) (a "lawyer shall not
enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client
expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client,
unless the client has consented after full disclosure"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)
(1983).
83. See, e.g., Doe v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
84. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans & Tracy L. Bentley, The Application of
Circular 230 in Estate Planning, 107 TAx NOTES 61, 68 (2005).
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dressed to a client, that the client may show the practitioner's written
advice to a third party and encourage the third party to rely on it. How-
ever, this concern could have been addressed by requiring a prominent
disclosure on the advice to the effect that it may not be relied upon by
any third party. Second, there may have been a concern about situations
where a practitioner's advice is used to develop a marketed transaction
even where the practitioner's opinion was not shown or described to the
third party, the practitioner was not directly involved in preparing the
marketing materials, and the marketing materials actually furnished to
potential purchasers describe the tax strategy and expected tax conse-
quences only in very general terms and counsel the recipient to seek the
advice of an independent tax advisor. In this case, the practitioner's opin-
ion is covered by the Circular 230 standards (absent a "legending out")
as a mechanism for regulating the development and marketing of tax
shelters, and not because the opinion may be relied upon by any third
party taxpayer; in effect, Treasury uses professional standards to create
an obligation on the part of a practitioner not to participate in the devel-
opment of tax shelters unless the practitioner can comply with the re-
quirements for marketed opinions.
iii. Reliance Opinions
An opinion is a "reliance opinion" if it concludes at a confidence
level of "more likely than not" (a greater-than-fifty-percent likelihood)
that one or more significant federal tax issues would be resolved in the
taxpayer's favor.8 5 A practitioner can exclude such an opinion (on other
than a listed or principal purpose transaction) by including a "no reli-
ance" legend. 86 A federal tax issue is "significant" if the IRS has a rea-
sonable basis for a successful challenge and the resolution of the issue
could have a significant impact, whether beneficial or adverse under any
reasonably foreseeable circumstance, on the overall federal tax treatment
of the transactions or matters addressed in the opinion.8 7
The "more likely than not" standard of Section 10.35 is based on
the standards in Code Section 6664 for opinions that may be relied upon
to establish reasonable cause and good faith for avoiding the accuracy-
related penalties with respect to corporate tax shelters. 88 However, there
are circumstances when a taxpayer cannot rely upon an opinion for that
purpose, even if it reaches a level of confidence of more likely than not.
85. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(i) (2006).
86. Id. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii).
87. Id. § 10.35(b)(3).
88. Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 3276,
3281 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
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For example, a taxpayer cannot rely on it to avoid penalties for report-
able transactions under Code Section 6662A if the practitioner rendering
the opinion is a "disqualified tax advisor., 89 Under such circumstances,
the opinion should not have to meet the standards for a reliance opinion.
A practitioner may "legend out" a reliance opinion by including a
"no reliance" legend.90 However, that legend is inaccurate in a number of
ways. Treasury stated in the 2004 preamble to Section 10.35 that it
would amend Treasury Regulations Section 1.6664-4 to clarify that tax-
payers may not rely on opinions with such a legend to establish reason-
able cause and good faith.9' However, no such amendment has been
promulgated;92 no regulation prevents a client from relying on an opinion
for this purpose, even if it contains a "no reliance" legend. Even if an
opinion does not meet the standards for avoiding penalties under Code
Section 6664, a taxpayer may be able to rely on it as a defense against
other penalties, such as the penalty under Section 6662(b)(1) for negli-
gence or disregard of rules or regulations 93 or the penalty under Section
6663 for fraud.94
c. Excluded Opinions
Section 10.35 contains exceptions for opinions that otherwise
would be defined as covered opinions under the foregoing rules. These
exceptions include (1) preliminary advice if the practitioner is reasonably
expected to later provide written advice satisfying the requirements of
Section 10.35; (2) opinions on retirement plan qualification, state or local
bond opinions, and opinions required to be filed with the Securities and
89. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2005).
90. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2006).
91. Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839,
75,840 (Dec. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
92. The absence of an amended regulation may reflect the fact that, because the Section 10.35
standards are much more detailed than those of Code Section 6664 and Treas. Reg. Section 1.6664-
4(c), an opinion could meet the general standards of Section 6664 but not meet certain requirements
of Section 10.35.
93. For this purpose, "negligence" includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
with the tax rules, and "disregard" means disregard that is careless, reckless or intentional. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b) (2003). See also WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at § 203.3.1.1 ("an
incorrect decision regarding an unsettled question of law does not constitute negligence, provided
the taxpayer's interpretation is not clearly untenable and is held in good faith"), citing United Title
Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 34, 53 (1988).
94. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at § 202.3.2, citing Jemison v. Comm'r, 45 F.2d 4 (5th
Cir. 1930); Whyte v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 677, affd, 852 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1988); Noel B.
Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 30 (2004).
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Exchange Commission,95 provided the opinion does not concern a listed
or principal purpose transaction; (3) opinions given after a tax return is
filed reflecting the tax benefits of a transaction; (4) so-called "negative
advice" concluding that a taxpayer will not prevail on an issue, at any
level of confidence; and (5) opinions rendered by a practitioner to his or
her employer about the employer's tax liabilities. 96 The preliminary ad-
vice exception has little value to the practitioner providing initial plan-
ning advice, as this practitioner cannot predict whether the planned
transaction will proceed, whether the client will continue to retain the
practitioner, and what subsequent advice the client ultimately will re-
quest.
2. Standards for Covered Opinions
The current covered opinion standards, like the prior rules, impose
requirements for factual due diligence and legal analysis. 97 However, the
covered opinion requirements for legal analysis differ from the prior
rules in many respects, including the required scope of the opinion and
exceptions to the required scope, required levels of confidence regarding
conclusions, and limitations on the content of the analysis and advice.
a. Due Diligence Standards
Section 10.35 requires a practitioner to use reasonable efforts to de-
termine relevant present and future facts and events, and prohibits reli-
ance on unreasonable assumptions or representations.9 8 A factual repre-
sentation is unreasonable if, among other things, the practitioner knows
or should know that it is incorrect or incomplete. 99 Section 10.37 applies
similar standards to non-covered written advice. 0 0 Section 10.35 also
requires a practitioner to identify and consider all facts identified as rele-
vant, and to identify in separate sections all factual assumptions and all
factual representations, statements, or findings relied upon by the practi-
tioner.
10 '
Section 10.35 specifically addresses assumptions and representa-
tions regarding the business purpose of a transaction: it is unreasonable
for a practitioner to assume that a transaction has a business purpose or
95. Treasury has issued proposed regulations regarding State and local bond opinions, and the
IRS has issued interim guidance regarding the definition of a State or local bond opinion for this
purpose. See supra notes 47-48.
96. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii) (2006).
97. Id. § 10.35(c).
98. Id. § 10.35(c)(1).
99. Id. § 10.35(c)(1)(iii).
100. See id. § 10.37(a).
101. Id. § 10.35(c)(1)(i).
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has the potential for nontax profits. 0 2 The practitioner may not rely on a
business purpose representation unless it specifically describes the pur-
pose, or if the practitioner knows or should know that it is incorrect or
incomplete. 0 3 This requirement addresses strategies that fit within the
literal terms of the Code and regulations but would not succeed without a
valid business purpose.
b. Standards of Legal Analysis
Section 10.35 generally requires a covered opinion to (1) relate the
applicable law (including judicial doctrines) to the relevant facts; (2)
consider all significant federal tax issues; (3) provide a conclusion as to
the likelihood that the taxpayer will prevail on each issue, and the facts
and analysis supporting the conclusion; and (4) provide an overall con-
clusion as to the likelihood that the federal tax treatment of the transac-
tion is proper, and the reasons for that conclusion.10 4 If the practitioner
cannot reach an overall conclusion or a conclusion on one or more is-
sues, the opinion must so state, and must include the reasons.105
i. Scope of Issues that Must be Addressed
Unless a covered opinion qualifies under an exception for limited
scope opinions or opinions that rely on the opinion of another practitio-
ner, it must address all "significant Federal tax issues."'1 6 It may not as-
sume that a significant federal tax issue will be resolved in the taxpayer's
favor. 10 7 A federal tax issue is significant for this purpose if it meets a
materiality threshold, the IRS has a reasonable basis for a successful
challenge, and the resolution could have a significant impact, whether
beneficial or adverse, under any reasonably foreseeable circumstance on
the overall federal tax treatment of the transaction.
0 8
The reasonable basis standard in Section 10.35 clearly is intended
to reflect the standard in Code Section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii), which permits a
taxpayer to avoid a substantial underpayment penalty if the taxpayer has
a reasonable basis for a position that is not associated with a tax shelter
and discloses the position on its tax return.'0 9 Under the applicable
Treasury Regulations, "reasonable basis" is a relatively high standard of
102. Id. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 10.35(c)(2)-(4).
105. Id. § 10.35(c)(4)(i).
106. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(i).
107. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(ii).
108. Id. § 10.35(b)(3).
109. See William M. Paul & Ronald M. Wiener, The Final Regulations Under Circular 230,
107 TAX NOTES 119, 122-23 (2005).
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tax reporting, significantly higher than "not frivolous" or "not patently
improper."" 0 The reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a merely
arguable return position or a merely colorable claim."' In contrast, for-
mer Section 10.33 required a practitioner to consider only material fed-
eral tax issues involving a "reasonable possibility of a challenge by the
IRS.""' 2 This standard allowed a practitioner to exercise professional
judgment in distinguishing between those issues that raised a possibility
of challenge, and thus required discussion, and those that did not.
In contrast, the reasonable basis standard of Section 10.35 does not
allow for such judgment. The standard is reasonably workable for defin-
ing the minimum plausibility of a disclosed tax return position to avoid
penalties. However, applying the standard to define the entire range of
issues to be considered in an opinion requires the practitioner to identify
not merely the positions that the IRS would most likely raise but rather
all positions that the IRS might take that are more than merely arguable,
colorable, frivolous or patently improper. 113 The practitioner must do so
even if the position has a low likelihood of success or the IRS is unlikely
to raise the issue for policy or other reasons." 14
The preambles to the new rules do not discuss why "reasonable ba-
sis" replaced "reasonable possibility of challenge." Treasury may have
thought that practitioners unduly discount the strength of IRS positions
or rely too heavily on the chances that an issue will not be raised on audit
or will be settled. However, it is hard to see why the goal of informing
investors about important issues is furthered by requiring that they also
be informed about unimportant ones. Alternatively, Treasury may have
chosen the "reasonable basis" standard simply to discourage tax shelters,
by requiring practitioners to present potential investors with a "parade of
horribles" or increasing the cost of tax shelter opinions. Such an ap-
proach assumes that tax shelters are per se illegitimate and should be dis-
couraged. However, the definition of a covered opinion for purposes of
Section 10.35 depends not on the merits of the relevant transaction but
on whether the transaction and the opinion fall within formal criteria in-
dicating the existence of a tax shelter. Finally, Treasury may have feared
that a practitioner would render a favorable conclusion on certain issues,
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2003).
111. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 669 (1993) (Conf. Rep.) ("The conferees intend
that 'reasonable basis' be a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than
'not patently improper.' This standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely arguable or
that is merely a colorable claim"); H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 754 (1993) (similar).
112. Former Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(4) (1984).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2003).
114. See BOSTON BAR ASS'N, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIRCULAR 230 4-6
(Mar. 25, 2005), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 6, 2005).
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leading investors to think they can rely on the opinion to avoid penalties,
while failing altogether to address issues that the IRS might in fact raise.
However, such a concern could have been addressed by requiring opin-
ions to state that the taxpayer may not rely on them to avoid penalties in
respect of issues that are not addressed.
ii. Exceptions for Reliance on Opinions of
Others and Limited Scope Opinions
Section 10.35 contains two exceptions to the general rule that a
covered opinion must address all significant federal tax issues. The first
exception is for an opinion in which the practitioner relies on the opinion
of another practitioner with respect to a significant federal tax issue. 115
The relying practitioner's opinion must identify the other opinion and set
forth its conclusions, and must conclude that the combined analysis and
overall conclusions of the opinions, taken as a whole, satisfy the re-
quirements of Section 10.35.16 This exception merely allows different
practitioners to split the responsibility for preparing opinions that to-
gether satisfy the requirements of Section 10.35. Although the exception
may be useful in practice, it has little importance in analyzing the
framework of the rules.
The second exception, for limited scope opinions that address less
than all significant federal tax issues in transactions,' 1 7 has greater sig-
nificance. Such opinions are permitted provided that (1) the practitioner
and the taxpayer agree that the scope of the opinion, and the taxpayer's
reliance on it for penalty purposes, are limited to the issues addressed in
the opinion; (2) the opinion does not relate to a listed or principal pur-
pose transaction and is not a marketed opinion; and (3) the opinion dis-
closes that it (A) is limited to the federal tax issues addressed,
(B) expresses no opinion on other issues that could affect the tax treat-
ment of the transaction, and (C) may not be used by the taxpayer to avoid
penalties with respect to such other issues. 1 8 The practitioner is not re-
quired to identify the federal tax issues that the opinion does not address.
Former Section 10.33 addressed only opinions used to market tax
shelters to third parties."19 It was thus reasonable to require disclosure
and analysis of all important federal tax issues associated with the trans-
action. Accordingly, the former rule contained no provision for limited
scope opinions. In contrast, present Section 10.35 also applies to advice
115. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(d)(1) (2006).
116. Id. § 10.35(d)(1).
117. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(v).
118. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A), (e)(4).
119. Former Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(c)(3) (1984).
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that is addressed to a client concerning the client's tax treatment. 20 There
is no obvious reason under this circumstance to prohibit a limited scope
opinion, yet Section 10.35 will not allow such an opinion if it concerns a
listed or principal purpose transaction, even if the opinion is not used for
marketing to third parties and even with a "no reliance" legend. Further-
more, even if addressed only to the practitioner's client concerning the
client's tax treatment, Section 10.35 will not allow an opinion if it is re-
ferred to by a third party in marketing, promoting or recommending the
transaction because this kind of opinion falls within the technical defini-
tion of a marketed opinion. There is no clear reason why any of these
limitations should apply.
The limited scope opinion also raises issues stemming from the fact
that the practitioner and the taxpayer must agree to limits on the tax-
payer's reliance on the opinion for penalty purposes.12 It is not clear that
such an agreement is binding on the taxpayer in its dealings with the IRS.
If it is, the practitioner is placed in the position of negotiating directly
with the client over the scope of the client's rights.1
22
iii. Required Level of Confidence Regarding Conclusions
If a covered opinion is not a marketed opinion, Section 10.35 does
not require conclusions on specific issues or the overall treatment of the
transaction at a minimum level of confidence. 23 However, if an opinion
fails to reach a favorable conclusion on one or more significant federal
tax issues at a "more likely than not" level, it must include a "no reli-
ance" legend with respect to those issues.' 24 Even if the opinion is not
subject to the foregoing requirements, it may remain subject to other re-
quirements of Circular 230, including those of Section 10.34, which im-
poses standards for advice on tax return positions. Under Section 10.34, a
practitioner may not advise a client to take a position on a tax return
unless (1) the practitioner determines that the position has a realistic pos-
sibility of being sustained on the merits, or (2) the position is not frivo-
lous and the practitioner advises the client of any opportunity to avoid
penalties through disclosure.' 25 A position is considered to have a realis-
120. Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 3276, 3279-81 (Jan. 12, 2001).
121. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A) (2006).
122. If the reason for requiring such an agreement was to ensure that the taxpayer has given
"informed consent" to the limited availability of the opinion for penalty purposes, that could have
been achieved more directly.
123. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(iv) (2006).
124. Id. § 10.35(e)(4).
125. Id. § 10.34(a). A position is frivolous if it is "patently improper." Id. § 10.34(d)(2).
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tic possibility of being sustained on its merits if the position has ap-
proximately a one-in-three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained.
2 6
In contrast, if a covered opinion is a marketed opinion, it must con-
clude that the taxpayer will prevail on each significant federal tax issue,
and that the federal tax treatment of the transaction is proper, at a confi-
dence level of at least "more likely than not.' ' 127 A practitioner who is
unable to reach such conclusions may not provide the marketed opinion.
However, the practitioner may provide written advice under the "legend-
ing out" exception by including a "no reliance" legend and a "consumer
protection" legend. 128 The "legending out" exception does not apply to
written advice regarding listed or principal purpose transactions.
The requirement that a marketed opinion reach "more likely than
not" conclusions reflects Treasury's view that the "reasonable basis" tax
shelter opinions permitted under former Section 10.33 were of question-
able legitimacy. 29 However, the requirement does not merely prohibit
favorable opinions where the practitioner in fact believes that tax benefits
are unlikely to be available. A practitioner may be unable to provide a
"more likely than not" opinion concerning a position because of the ab-
sence of published guidance; even if the position is as likely as any other
to succeed, Section 10.35 would prevent the practitioner from rendering
a marketed opinion.
Alternatively, a practitioner may be able to reach a "more likely
than not" conclusion regarding the primary tax benefits of a transaction
but not regarding some lesser benefit. If the secondary benefit would
have a "significant" impact on the overall tax treatment of the transac-
tion, the practitioner may not render a marketed opinion unless he con-
cludes that the benefit would not be allowable at any confidence level
(even at a "not frivolous" level). If the practitioner concludes that the
secondary benefit probably is not allowable but that the taxpayer would
have a more than frivolous case for claiming it, the practitioner would
not qualify for the "negative advice" exception.
In the case of a significant purpose transaction, the opinion may
qualify for the "legending out" exception. 130 However, the "legending
out" exception is not available for a listed or principal purpose transac-
tion. If the purpose of the "more likely than not" rules is to prevent prac-
titioners from encouraging positions that they believe unlikely to be al-
126. Id. § 10.34(d)(1).
127. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(iv).
128. Id. § 10.35(b)(5)(ii).
129. See Proposed Rules, Department of the Treasury, Tax Shelters, Practice Before the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,144, 56,145 n.I (Dec. 15, 1982).
130. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2006).
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lowable, there is little reason to treat listed and principal purpose transac-
tions differently from significant purpose transactions. The absence of a
"legending out" exception for listed and principal purpose transactions
may reflect a view that such transactions simply should not be marketed
if there is substantial uncertainty about the tax benefits. Prohibiting prac-
titioners from rendering marketed opinions about such transactions will
certainly make it difficult, if not impossible, to market them. However,
this motivation raises the question of the purpose of the Circular 230
opinion requirements: are they meant to be professional standards, or are
they being used as a tool for the regulation of otherwise permissible tax
shelter activity?
iv. Limitations on Content of Analysis and Advice
A covered opinion must not contain internally inconsistent legal
analyses or conclusions.' 3' Further, the practitioner may not provide ad-
vice to any person that is contrary to or inconsistent with a disclosure
required under Section 10.35.132 The rules do not define "internally in-
consistent" analyses or conclusions. Presumably, the term describes tak-
ing an analytical position to reach a favorable conclusion on one issue
and a contrary analytical position to reach a favorable conclusion on an-
other issue. In many circumstances, however, there is a question whether
different provisions of the Code and regulations embody the same con-
cept. For example, the practitioner may conclude that the same term
should be defined differently for purposes of different provisions. 33 If it
ultimately is determined that the same definition is used in provisions,
does the opinion violate the requirements of Section 10.35?
An opinion will often adopt alternative analyses, usually because a
particular point cannot be resolved with a sufficient level of certainty. If
the outcome of one alternative analysis as opposed to another could have
a significant impact on the overall tax treatment of the transaction, the
issue will be a significant federal tax issue. If pursuing the alternative
analyses leads the opinion to differing conclusions, are those analyses
and conclusions "internally inconsistent?"'
' 34
131. Id. § 10.35(c)(2)(iii).
132. Id. § 10.35(e)(5).
133. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that the term "money received" has a different meaning in Code Section 358(a)(1) from
its meaning in Code Section 357(b)(1)).
134. Alternative analyses also present problems for the requirement that a marketed opinion
reach a favorable conclusion at a confidence level of at least "more likely than not." At most, the
opinion can conclude that only one of the alternative analyses and resulting positions will "more
likely than not" be the correct resolution. Is analysis of the other alternatives prohibited in a mar-
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Prohibiting a practitioner from providing any advice inconsistent
with a required disclosure raises similar issues. Consider the "no reli-
ance" legend: a practitioner would appear to be prohibited from advising
the client that this legend is not relevant to the penalty for negligence or
fraud, even if, in fact, it is. In the case of a marketed opinion addressed to
a client, what is the practitioner to say if the client expresses puzzlement
about the disclosures that the opinion was written to support the promo-
tion or marketing of the relevant transaction, and that the client should
seek advice based on the client's particular circumstances from an inde-
pendent tax advisor?
One of the most serious limitations on the content of a covered
opinion or other written advice is that the practitioner must not take into
account the possibility that a tax return will not be audited, that an issue
will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be resolved through set-
tlement if raised. 135 The first two parts of the requirement were intended
to prevent practitioners from relying on the "audit lottery" in reaching
conclusions about the tax treatment of transactions. 136 Such a prohibition
is clearly sound and congruent with the duties of the practitioner to the
client and the tax system. However, once an issue is identified in an au-
dit, a practitioner should be permitted to analyze the likelihood that the
IRS will pursue the issue, or that the issue will be settled if raised. An
essential role of a tax advisor is to identify those issues that are most
likely to be raised and to assess the various ways that such issues may be
resolved. This is especially true in complex transactions: the IRS might
hypothetically raise a large number of tax issues, whereas in practice,
only the strongest challenges would emerge in any IRS audit or court
proceeding.
The IRS frequently issues revenue procedures stating that it will not
challenge positions taken by taxpayers under specific circumstances. 137
There are many other cases in which the IRS reaches conclusions in un-
settled areas. In some such areas there may be no authority other than
published, private, or internal rulings or other IRS pronouncements. In
other areas, there are applicable court decisions, but the IRS has stated
that it will not follow such decisions. Under the Circular 230 rules, a
practitioner may not rely solely on such statements in assessing the mer-
keted opinion? Must a covered opinion that is not a marketed opinion contain a "no reliance" dis-
closure if it analyses other alternatives?
135. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(iii) (2006).
136. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
TO CIRCULAR NO. 230, (July 25, 2001) reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 2, 2001).
137. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-40 I.R.B. 308 (qualifying certain property for like-
kind exchange treatment if it is held under arrangements meeting certain requirements).
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its of a position. 38 The practitioner would instead be required to assume
that the IRS will challenge the position and assess whether a court would
uphold the revenue procedure or other administrative pronouncement as
a correct statement of the tax law or find the pronouncement binding on
the IRS. Although such analysis may on occasion be appropriate, requir-
ing it in all circumstances eliminates the certainty and simplicity that
such revenue procedures and other IRS guidance are intended to create.
In conclusion, the current Circular 230 opinion standards represent
a substantial extension of the regulation of tax advice. The standards de-
fine covered opinions broadly and provide limited exceptions, including
exceptions based on legends that may be inaccurate or inappropriate.
Covered opinions are subject to rigid standards generally requiring a
comprehensive review and analysis of the applicable facts and legal is-
sues, and the overall treatment of the transaction. The standards also im-
pose limitations on the methods of analysis that may be used in the opin-
ion, required levels of confidence for certain types of advice, and re-
quired disclosures that the lawyer may not contradict. As discussed in
Part III, these requirements diverge significantly from the rules of legal
ethics and pronouncements regarding tax opinions.
III. ETHICAL RULES REGARDING TAX SHELTER OPINIONS
One of the most striking features of the Circular 230 covered opin-
ion standards is the standards' divergence from, and in certain respects
their conflict with, the rules of legal ethics and pronouncements regard-
ing tax opinions. 3 9 There is a broad body of legal ethics pronouncements
and rules affecting tax opinions, including (A) ABA Formal Opinion
346, which provides standards for marketed tax shelter opinions; (B)
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, which provides standards for advice re-
garding uncertain tax return positions; (C) draft opinion standards pro-
posed by the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the ABA Sec-
tion of Taxation; and (D) general principles of legal ethics set forth in the
Model Code, the Model Rules and related commentary.
138. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § I 0.35(c)(3)(iii) (2006).
139. The following discussion is based largely on the Model Code, the Model Rules and formal
opinions of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Though nearly
all States have adopted some version of the Model Code or the Model Rules, neither codification
sets forth binding ethical standards. The ethical standards of the relevant jurisdiction must also be
consulted. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 103. Likewise, ethics opinions represent a source
of interpretive guidance but are generally not binding on the courts. Id. § 103.1.2.
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A. Ethical Guidance Regarding Marketed Tax Shelter Opinions
ABA Formal Opinion 346 provides guidance regarding tax opin-
ions used to market tax shelters to third parties, seting forth "disciplinary
standards" and "ethical considerations." 140 The "disciplinary standards"
prohibit, among other things, the rendering of a false opinion, including
one that is intentionally or recklessly misleading or that is based on facts
that the lawyer knows are untrue.
141
The "ethical considerations" in Formal Opinion 346 reflect a "body
of principles," but do not "constitut[e] absolute requirements, the viola-
tion of which may result in sanctions.' 42 The ethical considerations re-
quire a lawyer, among other things, to (a) obtain access to relevant in-
formation, inquire as to the relevant facts and be satisfied that the pro-
moter's representations regarding the venture are clearly identified, rea-
sonable and complete; (b) relate the law to the facts and identify facts
that are assumed; (c) consider all material tax issues and ensure that all
issues having a reasonable possibility of challenge by the IRS are ad-
dressed in the offering materials; (d) provide, where possible, an opinion
on the likely outcome of such issues; (e) provide, where possible, an
overall evaluation whether the tax benefits in the aggregate are likely to
be realized; and (f) ensure that the offering materials correctly describe
the tax shelter opinion.
143
Formal Opinion 346 contains a narrow definition of a "tax shelter,"
but reasonably should apply to any marketed investment, plan or ar-
rangement designed to reduce federal taxes. 144 The Opinion limits the
definition of "tax shelter opinion" to broadly marketed opinions and tax




144. Formal Opinion 346 defines a tax shelter as follows:
[An investment which has as a significant feature for federal income or excise tax pur-
poses either or both of the following attributes: (1) deductions in excess of income from
the investment being available in any year to reduce income from other sources in that
year, and (2) credits in excess of the tax attributable to the income from the investment
being available in any year to offset taxes on income from other sources in that year. Ex-
cluded from the term are investments such as, but not limited to, the following: municipal
bonds; annuities; family trusts; qualified retirement plans; individual retirement accounts;
stock option plans; securities issued in a corporate reorganization; mineral development
ventures, if the only tax benefit would be percentage depletion; and real estate where it is
anticipated that deductions are unlikely to exceed gross income from the investment in
any year, and that any tax credits are unlikely to exceed the tax on the income from that
source in any year.
Id. at n.1.
2006] Circular 230 & Regulation of Professional Speech 869
in marketing materials.145 Accordingly, it excludes the following types of
advice:
* Advice rendered solely to the offeror, so long as neither the
name of the lawyer nor the fact that a lawyer has rendered tax
advice is referenced in the offering materials or in sales promo-
tion efforts;
* Cases in which a small group of investors negotiates the trans-
action directly with the offeror of securities and depends solely
on other advisors for tax advice.
146
Apart from the differences in the definitions of tax shelter and tax
shelter opinion, the principal differences between Formal Opinion 346
and Section 10.35 concern the scope of the issues that a tax shelter opin-
ion must address and the level of confidence that the opinion must reach.
Under Formal Opinion 346, a lawyer should consider all "material
tax issues" or ensure that they are considered by another competent pro-
fessional. 147 The opinion should address each material tax issue having a
reasonable possibility of an IRS challenge. 48 For this purpose, a "mate-
rial" tax issue is an issue having a significant effect in sheltering from
taxes. 149 The "reasonable possibility of an IRS challenge" standard in
Formal Opinion 346 permits the lawyer to exercise substantially greater
judgment than the "reasonable basis" standard in Section 10.35.
Formal Opinion 346 requires a tax shelter opinion to state the prob-
able outcome of each material tax issue, where possible. 50 Also, the tax
disclosure in the offering materials should include an overall evaluation
as to whether the aggregate tax benefits are likely to be realized.' 5' The
lawyer should state whether the benefits probably will or probably will
not be realized or whether the probabilities are evenly divided. 52 If such
a judgment is impossible, the lawyer should explain why and assure full
disclosure in the offering materials of the assumptions and risks. 53 For-
145. Formal Opinion 346 generally defines a tax shelter opinion as follows:
[Aidvice by a lawyer concerning the federal tax law applicable to a tax shelter if the ad-
vice is referred to either in offering materials or in connection with sales promotion ef-
forts directed to persons other than the client that engages the lawyer to give the advice.
The [definition] includes the tax aspects ... portion of the offering materials prepared by
the lawyer whether or not a separate opinion letter is issued.
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mal Opinion 346 does not set forth a minimum level of confidence for a
tax shelter opinion.154 However, if it reaches a negative conclusion, that
conclusion must be clearly and prominently noted in the offering materi-
als. 55 Thus, Formal Opinion 346 stands in contrast to the requirement in
Section 10.35 that a marketed covered opinion provide "more likely than
not" conclusions on each significant federal tax issue and the overall tax
treatment of the transaction.
B. Ethical Guidance Regarding Opinions on Tax Return Positions
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 sets forth standards for advice regard-
ing uncertain tax return positions. 156 It provides that a lawyer may rec-
ommend positions favorable to a client if the lawyer has a good faith be-
lief that the positions are warranted in existing law or can be supported
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. 157 Good faith requires some realistic possibility of success
if the position is litigated, but may exist even if the lawyer believes that
the client's position probably will not prevail. 58 Formal Opinion 85-352
also states the following duties of a lawyer in rendering tax advice:
* The lawyer should counsel the client as to whether a court is
likely to sustain the position.
* The lawyer should counsel the client regarding the potential
penalties and other legal consequences, including a judgment as
to whether the position has sufficient merit to avoid penalties
with or without disclosure.
0. A lawyer must not mislead the IRS deliberately, either by mis-
statements, silence, or permitting the client to mislead.' 59
A Special Task Force established by the ABA Tax Section issued a
report (the "Special Task Force Report") concluding that Formal Opinion
85-352 applies both to advice rendered in the preparation of a tax return
and to other advice involving tax return positions, including tax advice
154. See id. See also WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 503.4.2.6 (stating that "it would be
difficult to conclude that a practitioner who provides an adequately disclosed negative opinion vio-
lated a professional standard").
155. Formal Opinion 346, supra note 35. Formal Opinion 346 also notes that a tax shelter
opinion may question the validity of a revenue ruling or the reasoning of a lower court opinion. Id.
However, there must be a complete explanation of such questioning, including an assessment of
what position the IRS is likely to take on the issue and, if applicable, a summary of why this position
is wrong, and a statement of the risks of an adversarial proceeding. Id.
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rendered while structuring transactions or preparing transaction docu-
ments. 60 According to the Special Task Force Report, a position has a
realistic possibility of success if the likelihood of success before a court
closely approaches one-third, or if the position is supported by "substan-
tial authority.' 16' A position with a realistic possibility of success may be
asserted to obtain a concession in settlement negotiations.
161
Formal Opinion 85-352 differs from the covered opinion require-
ments of Section 10.35 in a number of ways. The standards of Formal
Opinion 85-352 apply only when advice relates to tax return positions.
Accordingly, it appears that preliminary or hypothetical planning advice
is not covered by Formal Opinion 85-352. Formal Opinion 85-352 re-
quires a lawyer to counsel the client regarding potential penalties, but
does not require every tax opinion to state the permissible extent of reli-
ance on the opinion itself as a defense against penalties. Advice that is
subject to Formal Opinion 85-352 need not consider all tax issues related
to the transaction, nor does Formal Opinion 85-352 prohibit internally
consistent legal analysis or conclusions. While a lawyer may only rec-
ommend a position that has a reasonable possibility of success if the po-
sition is litigated, the Special Task Force Report appears to permit a law-
yer to recommend such positions with the expectation that they will be
resolved through settlement. Finally, the "realistic possibility of success"
standard of Formal Opinion 85-352 is lower than the "more likely than
not" standard imposed on marketed opinions by Section 10.35.
C. Proposed ABA Tax Opinion Standards
The Committee on Standards of Tax Practice of the ABA Section
of Taxation prepared a draft Statement of Standards of Tax Practice
2000-2 setting forth standards for written federal tax opinions (the Draft
Statement). 163 Although the Draft Statement has not been finalized or
reviewed, it addresses many of the same topics addressed in the covered
opinion standards of Section 10.35.
160. Paul J. Sax, James P. Holden, Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., David E. Watts & Bernard
Wolfman, Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 635 (1986).
The Special Task Force Report was approved by the Council of the Section of Taxation of the ABA
but not reviewed or approved by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, which had originally issued Formal Opinion 85-352. Id. at 635. Accordingly, the authorita-
tive effect of the Special Task Force Report is not clear. WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 204.1.
161. Sax et al., supra note 160, at 638-39.
162. Id. at 639.
163, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DRAFT
STATEMENT OF STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 2000-2 (Sept. 13, 2000), reprinted in TAX NOTES
TODAY (Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter DRAFT STATEMENT].
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The Draft Statement is limited to tax opinions addressing specific
factual circumstances and providing a legal conclusion. Accordingly, it
does not apply to advice that is abstract, tentative or preliminary. The
standards include the following:
* A tax opinion should state the purposes for which it was pre-
pared and how it may be relied upon, where appropriate, to
avoid a risk of misunderstanding.
" A tax opinion should clearly identify the material factual cir-
cumstances. An attorney need not audit such facts, but must
make further inquiry if they are materially incomplete, incon-
sistent, or otherwise implausible, and may not issue an opinion
on the basis of representations known to be false. An opinion
addressed to a third party should describe the relevant due dili-
gence and assumptions and may not ignore relevant facts.
" A tax opinion should relate the applicable legal authorities to
the facts.
" A tax opinion should identify all material tax issues for which
no opinion is being rendered, if reasonably necessary to avoid a
misunderstanding.
* A tax opinion should express the author's degree of confidence
and, if appropriate, discuss whether the position has sufficient
merit to avoid penalties. An opinion may be given for the stated
purpose of penalty protection only if the author concludes that
the required level of probability exists as of the relevant date.
* A lawyer should advise a client regarding penalties that may be
imposed because of a tax return position recommended by the
lawyer. 164
The Draft Statement (1) does not define material tax issues; (2)
permits limited scope opinions; and (3) does not impose a minimum
level of confidence.
The greater flexibility of the Draft Statement reflects a view that the
duties of a lawyer rendering a tax opinion should be defined by reference
to the purpose of the opinion and the legal and ethical standards that ap-
ply to the lawyer and the recipient of the opinion. Implicit in the Draft
Statement is a lawyer's obligation to ascertain those standards and to
conform the opinion to them.
164. Id.
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D. General Ethical Principles Applicable to Tax Shelter Opinions
The legal ethics rules, pronouncements, and commentary provide
guidance on a range of issues that are relevant to tax shelter opinions.
Those issues include (1) the general duties of a lawyer to clients and to
the tax system; (2) standards for factual due diligence; (3) the scope of
legal issues that must be addressed in the opinion; (4) required levels of
confidence regarding conclusions; (5) limitations on the content of the
analysis and advice in an opinion; and (6) required disclosures. In con-
trast to the rigid Circular 230 opinion standards, the legal ethics rules,
pronouncements and commentary provide general standards that must be
applied on the basis of the relevant circumstances.
1. General Duties of a Lawyer to Clients and to the Tax System
Canons 7 and 8 of the Model Code contain the ethical rules govern-
ing a lawyer's duties to the client and to the tax system. 65 Canon 7 pro-
vides that a lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds
of the law. 16 6 Canon 8 provides that a lawyer should assist in improving
the legal system. 167 The Model Code does not view these duties as con-
flicting; to the extent that a conflict arises, it generally should be resolved
in favor of the client. 68 For a lawyer serving as advocate, Ethical Con-
sideration 7-19 states more directly that "[t]he duty of a lawyer to his
client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law."' 169 By contrast, the obligations of
lawyers to assist in improving the legal system largely arise outside the
context of a specific client representation.
70
Notwithstanding the client-centered position of the Model Code,
most commentators express the view that, when providing tax advice to a
client, the lawyer's duty to promote the interests of the client is limited
by a duty to the tax system as a whole.171 Such duty generally is justified
165. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, 8 (1983).
166. Id. at Canon 7.
167. Id. at Canon 8.
168. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983) ("[t]he duty of a law-
yer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of
the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations"); Id. at EC 8-4
(a lawyer may advocate legislative or administrative changes on behalf of a client even though he
does not agree with them).
169. Id. at EC 7-19 (1983).
170. See, e.g., Id. at EC 8-1 (1983) ("[lawyers] should participate in proposing and supporting
legislation and programs to improve the system, without regard to the general interests or desires of
clients").
171. See, e.g., WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 101.2 (The "practitioner's obligation to the
client, however, is not unrestricted. The practitioner also owes a duty, albeit less well-defined, to the
tax system as a whole."); Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U.
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by the self-assessment nature of the federal income tax system and the
inability of the IRS to audit a meaningful percentage of returns filed. 72 A
number of commentators argue, on various theories, that a lawyer has a
duty to the tax system regardless of whether a particular transaction is
likely to be audited. 173 The basis and scope of this duty to the system are
not clear; beyond basic principles, the views regarding the fundamental
sources of a lawyer's duties to the tax system are all over the map.174
This lack of consensus extends to the question of what a lawyer
should do when a client does not accept the lawyer's duty to the system.
Under the Model Code, a lawyer "may continue the representation of his
client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct
contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby know-
ingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous
FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1028-30 (1987); Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics and Real Ethics: A
Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643, 662 (1986); Linda Galler, The Tax
Lawyer's Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 693-96 (1997) (reviewing BERNARD
WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE (1995)); Myron C. Grauer, What 's Wrong with This Picture?: The Tension Between Ana-
lytical Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 353, 362-63
(1991); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Reply, Counseling Ordered Liberty, 9 VA. TAX REV. 781 (1990)
[hereinafter Handelman, Counseling]; Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return
Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 77 (1989) [herinafter Handelman, Constraining]; James P. Holden, Practi-
tioners 'Standard of Practice and the Taxpayer's Reporting Position, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 327 (1991)
[hereinafter Holden, Practitioners'Standard]; James P. Holden, Commentary, Constraining Aggres-
sive Return Advice; 9 VA. TAX REV. 771 (1990) [hereinafter Holden, Constraining]; Loren D. Pres-
cott, Jr., Challenging the Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
693, 772 (1997); Deborah H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2004-05 (1982) (review-
ing BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE
(1981)). But see Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System,
47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 909 (1999) (arguing that although "it has been stated that tax lawyers have
a separate duty to the tax system, this author maintains that should not be the case").
172. See, e.g., WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 201.2; Galler, supra note 171, at 694-95.
173. The theories include the notion that tax returns are a collective obligation of citizenship
(see WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 201.2; Falk, supra note 171, at 648), that the duties of tax
lawyers should be aligned with the client's obligations (see WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, §
101.2; Durst, supra note 171, at 1047-48), that taxpayers should duly assert positions having legiti-
mate authoritative support (see Handelman, Counseling, supra note 171, at 786), and that the flexi-
bility taxpayers and advisers have to structure affairs to minimize taxes creates obligations to the tax
system (see WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 503. 1).
174. See, e.g., Durst, supra note 171, at 1059-64 (distinguishing between rules imposing nor-
mative obligations and those meant to discourage specific activity); Falk, supra note 171, at 663
("[t]ax shelters raise distinctive problems that justify unique ethical rules for tax shelter advice");
Grauer, supra note 171, at 358 (duty of lawyer derives from taxpayer's duty to file true and correct
tax return); Handelman, Counseling, supra note 171, at 781-86 (lawyer's reporting position duties
derive from the client's duties to comply with Code as can be best determined); Holden, Practitio-
ners'Standard, supra note 171, at 327 (source of professional standards is "generally not the tax law
itself [, but the] authority that has the power to regulate professional practice within the tax field").
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legal position."'' 75 Likewise, under Formal Opinion 85-352, a lawyer has
no duty to withdraw merely because a client refuses to disclose a position
on a tax return that could subject the client to penalties.1 76 By contrast,
the Special Task Force Report concludes that a lawyer must withdraw
from representing a client that insists on asserting a tax return position
that does not have a realistic possibility of success if litigated. 1
77
2. Due Diligence Standards
Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules impose specific stan-
dards of factual inquiry. However, a lawyer's duty to make appropriate
inquiry can be derived from more general requirements, especially as
related to competent178 and zealous representation within the bounds of
the law, 179 and communication with third parties.1 80 When advising a cli-
ent, a lawyer's duty of inquiry is circumstantial and subject to reasonable
agreement between the lawyer and the client.1 81 The Model Rules permit
a client to limit the scope of a lawyer's investigation when preparing an
evaluation for use by a third party.182 However, the limitation must be
disclosed to the third party, and the lawyer must not knowingly make a
false statement of material law or fact.' 83 Under some circumstances, the
terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or
sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of the search may be
limited by time constraints or the non-cooperation of persons having
175. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1983); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(l) (2004) (noting that "a lawyer shall not represent a client [where] the
representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law").
176. Formal Opinion 85-352, supra note 156 states the following:
[W]here a lawyer has a good faith belief in the validity of a position in accordance with
the [realistic possibility of success standard] that a particular transaction does not result in
taxable income or that certain expenditures are properly deductible as expenses, the law-
yer has no duty to require as a condition of his or her continued representation that riders
be attached to the client's tax return explaining the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action or the expenditures.
Id.
177. See, e.g., WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 204.2.4.1.
178. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
179. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.3, 2.1,3.1 (2003).
180. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a), 4.1 (2003).
181. Id. at R. 1.1, 1.2(c).
182. Id. at R. 2.3 cmt.
183. Id. As noted above, ABA Formal Opinion 85-352 likewise provides that a lawyer is under
a duty not to mislead the IRS deliberately, either by misstatements or by silence or by permitting the
client to mislead.
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relevant information. 184 Under the Model Rules, "[a]ny such limitations
that are material to the evaluation should be described."'
' 85
In contrast, Formal Opinion 346 and the Draft Statement impose
more explicit duties to inquire into the relevant facts. 186 Formal Opinion
346 ignores a client's right to limit the scope of a lawyer's investigation.
Other relevant authorities, including the regulations regarding return pre-
parer penalties and Section 10.34 of Circular 230, governing advice with
respect to tax return positions, adopt similar standards.
187
3. Scope of Issues That Must Be Addressed
The Model Code and Model Rules provide only general guidelines
regarding the issues that a lawyer must address when advising a client.
Both codifications recognize the tension between the lawyer's duty of
competence and the client's right to limit the scope of the lawyer's work,
and both seek to resolve the tension through a process of informed con-
sent. 188 Though Canon 6 and Disciplinary Rule 6-1 O1(A)(2) of the Model
Code and Model Rule 1.1 state that competent representation requires
certain levels of knowledge and preparation, the comment to Model Rule
1.1 recognizes that "[a]n agreement between the lawyer and the client
regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which
the lawyer is responsible."'
189
Formal Opinion 346 is the most detailed ethical guideline regarding
the required scope of issues that must be addressed in a tax shelter opin-
ion. It requires a lawyer rendering a marketed opinion to address each
material issue raising the reasonable possibility of an IRS challenge.'
90
However, Formal Opinion 346, like the other guidance, relies on the
lawyer's judgment to identify the material issues the IRS is likely to raise
and to assess the level of analysis required for each issue.' 9' The Draft
Statement also takes the lawyer's judgment as its point of reference, rely-
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. (2003).
185. Id.
186. Formal Opinion 346, supra note 35 (summarizing the duty of a lawyer to verify the facts
underlying a tax shelter opinion); DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 163 (summarizing the duty of a
lawyer to make factual inquiry when rendering tax opinions).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e) (1992). See also Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.22 (2006) (due
diligence standard for practitioners); WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 502.1.1.
188. See Symposium, When Worlds Collide: Ethics v. Economics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 365
(1991). See also WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 502.1.2 (discussing ABA Section of Taxation
draft informal opinion addressing the question of whether a lawyer may reduce research on behalf of
a client if the client so requests).
189. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2003). See also Id. at R. 1.2(a), (c)-(d),
1.4(a)-(b) (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1983).
190. Formal Opinion 346, supra note 35.
191. Id.
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ing on the lawyer's assessment of the potential for misunderstanding if
an issue is not addressed in an opinion.'
92
4. Required Level of Confidence Regarding Conclusions
The views on the level of confidence required before a lawyer can
recommend a tax position to a client are as diverse as the views regard-
ing the nature of the lawyer's duties to the system. At one pole is Model
Rule 1.2(d), which provides that a lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but allows
that a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct and counsel a client in a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.' 93 The comment to
Model Rule 1.2(d) notes that determining such validity "may require a
course of action involving disobedience." '1 94 Formal Opinion 85-352 uses
the standard of the lawyer's good faith belief in "some realistic possibil-
ity of success if the matter is litigated."' 95 The Special Task Force Report
states that this standard should be met if the likelihood of success ap-
proaches one-third or the position is based on "substantial authority."',
96
The "realistic possibility of success" standard has been adopted in the
context of return preparer penalties and in Section 10.34.197
Commentators differ regarding the proper interpretation of these
standards. A principal difference concerns the extent to which the stan-
dard should be subjective or objectively verifiable. Many commentators
view a percentage-based standard as unacceptably subjective and unad-
ministrable.' 98 However, little consensus exists on how to frame a more
objective standard, including questions of whether the standard should be
based on the reasonableness of the position' 99 or specifically tied to
available tax authorities. 20 0 Another principal difference concerns the
192. DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 163.
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. (2003).
195. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1986).
196. Sax et al., supra note 160, at 638-39.
197. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii)-(iii) (1992); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-2(b)(l)-(2) (2003).
198. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 302.3.1.1; Falk, supra note 171, at 657; Handel-
man, Constraining, supra note 171, at 97; J. Timothy Philipps, Michael W. Mumbach & Morgan W.
Alley, What Part of RPOS Don't You Understand? An Update and Survey of Standards for Tax
Return Positions, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1163 (1994).
199. See, e.g., Sax et al., supra note 160; Durst, supra note 171, at 1074; Holden, Practitio-
ners'Standard, supra note 171, at 333-34.
200. See, e.g., Symposium, Law and Order Comes to "Dodge City": Treasury's New Return
Preparer and IRS Practice Standards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 631, 637 (1993). Cf Holden, Con-
straining, supra note 171, at 774; Philipps et al., supra note 201, at 1173; Lin M. Trucksess, Paint-
ing the Gray Zone Grayer: Why Substantial Authority Fails as a Replacement for the Reasonable
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approach that a lawyer should take to uncertain issues, including posi-
tions that have some realistic possibility of success but probably will not
succeed. Several commentators advocate a minimal standard for litigat-
ing a position in Tax Court on the ground that a taxpayer's right to pur-
sue a position in Tax Court would be meaningless without the right to
20take such a position on the tax return. Some would impose a higher
standard, at least for undisclosed positions, on the ground that the self-
assessment system presumes that tax returns are correct without the need
for an audit.20 2 However, commentators generally have not proposed a
standard requiring that the position be "more likely than not" to succeed,
because such a standard would unduly limit taxpayers' access to the Tax
Court on uncertain positions.2 °3
5. Limitations on Content of Analysis and Advice
The ethical rules do not expressly limit the method of analyzing a
legal problem beyond requiring competence, action within the bounds of
law, and the application of generally accepted methods of legal analysis.
Commentators generally agree with such standards while noting the dif-
Basis Standard in Assessing Practitioner Conduct Under Circular 230, 8 VA. TAX REV. 743, 758
(1989).
201. Such right was well articulated by Franklin Green:
Under our system, a taxpayer is permitted to take a position with a substantially less than
50 percent likelihood of success if that position nevertheless has a sufficient degree of
merit. It is then incumbent on the government to raise questions on audit and to seek de-
ficiencies in tax from the taxpayer who has the right not to pay the disputed amount until
the matter has been litigated .... [l]t has been a fundamental role of tax practitioners to
identify for taxpayers those tax return positions that may be attempted and those that are
beyond the pale . . . . In a real sense, the tax adviser is a gatekeeper who regulates the
flow of issues into the system.
Franklin L. Green, Exercising Judgment in the Wonderland Gymnasium, 90 TAX NOTES 1691, 1692
(2001). See also Durst, supra note 171, at 1071-73; Holden, Commentary, supra note 171, at 774;
Holden, Practitioners 'Standard, supro note 171, at 334; Philipps et al., supra note 201, at 1184-86;
Symposium, It's Not Easy Being Easy: Advising Tax Return Positions, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
589, 597 (1993); Trucksess, supra note 203, at 757 (the "primary allocation of responsibility rests
with the taxpayer who makes the decisions with regard to his return").
202. See, e.g., Handelman, Constraining, supra note 171, at 91. The notion of setting a higher
standard for professionals than for taxpayers has been criticized because of the tension such discrep-
ancy would create in the lawyer-client relationship. See, e.g., Durst, supra note 171, at 1043; Hol-
den, Practitioners 'Standard, supra note 171, at 341. Cf Grauer, supra note 171, at 357 n.2 1.
203. See, e.g., WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 202.2; Durst, supra note 171, at 1071-72;
William A. Falik, Standards for Professionals Providing Tax Opinions in Tax Shelter Offerings, 37
TAX LAW. 701, 713 (1984); Handelman, Constraining, supra note 171, at 98; Philipps et al., supra
note 201, at 1185. But see Pollack & Soled, supra note 22, at 211-12; Soled, supra note 22, at 1650-
53; Mortimer Caplin, The Tax Lawyer's Role in the Way the American Tax System Works, Lecture
Before the American College of Tax Counsel (Jan. 22, 2005), reprinted in 24 VA. TAX REV. 969,
977 (2005); Ann Southworth, Note, Redefining the Attorney's Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37
STAN. L. REV. 889, 916-17 (1985).
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ficulty of applying them.2 °4 The return preparer penalties and Section
10.34 require that an undisclosed position have a realistic possibility of
success.20 Both the preparer penalty regulations and Section 10.34 in-
corporate the standards for determining whether "substantial authority"
exists for a tax return position for purposes of the substantial understate-
ment penalties. 0 6 However, those standards do not prescribe a compre-
hensive method of legal analysis; instead, they simply identify the types
of authorities that may support a position and the weight to be given to
those authorities.
Once it is assumed that a position will be raised on audit, the Model
Code and the Model Rules clearly permit a lawyer to consider the likeli-
hood that the IRS would challenge the position or agree to a settle-
ment.207 Formal Opinion 85-352 appears to permit a lawyer to consider
the likelihood that the IRS will agree to a settlement. The Special Task
Force Report states that the determination whether the position has a re-
alistic possibility of success "assumes that the issue is in court and to be
decided,2 8 but also states that a position may be asserted in a return as a
bargaining position if the position has a realistic possibility of success if
litigated. 0 9
As discussed above, requiring a lawyer to ignore the discretion ex-
ercised by the IRS prevents a lawyer from performing one of the essen-
tial functions of tax advice. Additionally, requiring a lawyer to assume
that a matter will come before a court ignores the role of the IRS as an
interpreter of the tax law. The degree to which IRS positions affect court
decisions is beyond the scope of this Article.210 However, in broad terms,
204. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2003); Symposium, Law and
Order, supra note 203, at 639-642; Handelman, Constraining, supra note 171, at 96-98; Philipps et
al., supra note 201, at 1173-74; Caplin, supra note 203, at 976-79. There is debate concerning is-
sues such as the extent to which a well-reasoned construction of a statute will suffice. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Law and Order, supra note 203, at 639-642.
205. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (2003); Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. §
10.34(a) (2006).
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1), (b)(2) (2003) (incorporating Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(iiHiii) (1992)). Oddly, Section 10.34 does not incorporate the standards in the regulations
for weighing the persuasiveness of those authorities. See Philipps et al., supra note 201, at 1168
n.27.
207. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8, 7-15 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.4(d), 2.1 cmt. (2003).
208. Sax et al., supra note 160, at 638.
209. Id. at 639.
210. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is the Internal Revenue Service
Bound by its own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAX LAW. 675 (1998); John F. Coverdale, Court
Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35
(1995); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1995); Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue
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a court may treat the position of the IRS as (1) binding on the IRS or
both the IRS and the taxpayer; (2) meriting deference; (3) meriting no
stronger weight than the position of the taxpayer; or (4) meriting no
weight, for example, because it intentionally conflicts with the Code.
Even when a court accords the IRS position no deference, the agency
acts in an interpretive role, if for no other reason than the position will be
publicly articulated and consequently taken into account by taxpayers.
Because of the important substantive role of the IRS and its de facto
role as a wielder of administrative discretion, a lawyer should be permit-
ted to take into account the likely position of the IRS, whether in pub-
lished guidance or otherwise, in reaching a conclusion about the substan-
tive merits of a taxpayer's position. A contrary rule would compromise
the lawyer's duty to a client.21' Consider, for example, a revenue proce-
dure that expressly permits a taxpayer's position but is inconsistent with
the tax law and would not be binding on the IRS in litigation. A taxpayer
would have a right to file a tax return based on the revenue procedure,
subject to the risk that the IRS might later seek to take a contrary posi-
tion,2 12 but the lawyer would be prevented from advising a client to do
so.2 13 If a taxpayer would have the right to file a tax return on that basis,
it cannot be unethical for a lawyer to advise a client on the same basis.
Under the regulations specifying the "permissible authorities" that
may be taken into account when determining whether "substantial au-
thority" exists for a tax return position, 214 administrative pronouncements
of the IRS, including pronouncements such as private letter rulings that
do not have precedential value and would be given little or no deference
by a court, are treated as "authority." 21 5 The weight given to an authority
Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841 (1992); Symposium, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven
Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637 (1996).
211. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 202.3.1.2 (arguing adviser who ignored nonbind-
ing IRS pronouncements "likely breached his duty of competence to the client").
212. The extent to which a court would hold the IRS to a position expressed in a revenue pro-
cedure that is contrary to the tax law is not entirely clear. See Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 96 T.C. 204 (1991) (holding revenue procedures generally not binding on the IRS unless
failure to follow would constitute abuse of discretion).
213. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis, Wall Street Rules: Feline Prides get IRS Im-
primatur, TAX NOTES (Aug. 1, 2003) (Revenue procedures are "declarations of how the IRS will
administer the law, even if the result contravenes it."). Cf Terence Floyd Cuff, Real Estate and the
Deferred Exchange Regulations, in 562 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TAX LAW AND PRACTICE 457,
856 (2003) (If"[Rev. Proc. 2000-37] is inconsistent with the law, then it is not a legitimate approach
to law enforcement.").
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1992).
215. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2005). In general, a court gives weight to a private letter ruling only
as evidence that the IRS has taken the positions stated therein. See, e.g., Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United
States, 452 U.S. 247, 261 n.17 (1981); True Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d. 1294, 1302 (10th Cir.
1999); Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045, 1060 (1992); Vons Cos., Inc. v. United
States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 8-11 (2001).
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depends not only on its persuasiveness but also on the type of the admin-
istrative pronouncement, the level of formal agency review, and the ex-
tent to which the pronouncement is intended as a general statement of the
position of the IRS.216 Thus, a revenue ruling will be given greater
weight than a private letter ruling, and certain older authorities will be
given less weight than more recent ones.21 7 A lawyer should not be
deemed unethical for applying the same principles.
6. Required Disclosures
The ethical rules do not contain any specific disclosure requirement
corresponding to the "no reliance" and "consumer protection" legends of
Circular 230. Formal Opinion 85-352 and the Draft Statement require a
lawyer to counsel the client regarding penalties,2 18 but neither document
requires every tax opinion to state the permissible extent of reliance on
the opinion itself as a defense against penalties. The Draft Statement
provides merely that, if an opinion has been prepared for the specific
purpose of penalty protection, the author must comply in good faith with
the standards for penalty protection opinions and include a specific rep-
resentation to that effect in the opinion.2 19
In contrast, the general effect of Section 10.35 is to require that all
tax opinions include a "no reliance" legend unless the advice complies
with the covered opinion rules and expresses conclusions at a confidence
level of at least "more likely than not." As discussed above, the legend is
inaccurate in a number of respects. Requiring a lawyer to include a "no
reliance" legend where the advice could in fact be relied upon by the
taxpayer conflicts with a lawyer's ethical duties to provide competent
advice and to exercise independent judgment. 220 The prohibition in Sec-
tion 10.35 against a lawyer's providing advice inconsistent with such a
disclosure prevents the lawyer from correcting the misstatement.22 1 There
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1992).
217. Id. A revenue ruling is more likely to be given binding effect or deference by a court.
However, the "substantial authority" standards do not require a determination whether a court would
give weight to a particular pronouncement because it represents the position of the IRS. Instead they
give weight to the pronouncement because it is the outcome of a deliberative process by the IRS.
218. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1986); DRAFT
STATEMENT, supra note 163.
219. DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 163.
220. See J. Matthew Miller, Note, Balancing the Budget on the Backs of America's Elderly-
Section 4734 of the Balanced Budget Act: Criminalization of the Attorney's Role as Advisor and
Counselor, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 210-13 (1998) (describing the chilling effect of overbroad
prohibitions on lawyer speech).
221. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Practitioner Advice as a Defense Against
Penalties, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 13, 2005) ("[l]t doesn't seem professionally responsible to tell
the client in any and all written-advice situations that advice cannot be relied on for penalty protec-
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are circumstances in which a lawyer faced with this situation may feel
required to withdraw from a representation, 222 and the same ethical issues
that forced the lawyer's withdrawal could keep the client from procuring
alternative legal advice regarding the tax treatment of the transaction.
Finally, the "consumer protection" requirement in Section 10.35 for
both marketed opinions and opinions that are not marketed opinions be-
cause they are "legended out" raises issues of professional ethics similar
to those raised by the "no reliance ' legend. Where an opinion is rendered
by a lawyer to a client in a true lawyer-client relationship concerning the
client's tax treatment, the required disclosure that the opinion was writ-
ten to support the promotion or marketing of the relevant transaction, and
that the taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer's particular
circumstances from an independent tax advisor, are patently incorrect
and undermine the confidence that a client is entitled to place in a law-
yer. Under the ethical rules, the lawyer is required to exercise independ-
ent professional judgment on behalf of the client free of the interests of
223third parties. Where a lawyer is acting in a manner consistent with his
or her ethical obligations, there is no reason to require the lawyer to
make statements suggesting otherwise.
In conclusion, the Circular 230 opinion standards extend substan-
tially beyond the standards in the legal ethics rules and guidance. Except
for marketed tax shelter opinions, the legal ethics rules and guidance
permit advice to be crafted to the specific needs of the client, and do not
impose specific requirements regarding factual due diligence, the scope
of the legal issues that must be addressed, methods of analysis, or re-
quired disclosures. Moreover, various requirements in Section 10.35 may
conflict with a lawyer's duties under the ethics rules and guidance, par-
ticularly: (1) the requirement that a covered opinion address all material
tax issues; (2) the requirement that certain covered opinions reach con-
clusions at a confidence level of at least "more likely than not"; (3) the
prohibitions against certain methods of analysis; and (4) certain required
disclosures.
tion when, absent that disclaimer, the practitioner believes that the law, regulation, and cases would
allow that reliance.").
222. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2003). Cf ABA Section of Taxation,
Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, Report, Statement of Standards of Tax Practice 2000-1, in
54 TAX LAW. 185 (2000) (addressing conflicts between the penalty rules for taxpayers and profes-
sional rules for lawyers providing advice on tax return positions); Green, supra note 201, at 1703,
1709 (arguing disparity between rules applicable to taxpayers and rules applicable to practitioners
advising tax return positions creates conflicts of interest).
223. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1983); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (2003).
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON THE
REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
First Amendment case law has infrequently addressed attempts by
the government to regulate the content and presentation of advice and
other non-solicitation type speech by professionals. The limited case law
and commentary in this area suggests a model that defines permissible
regulation of professional speech largely by reference to the role of the
profession in society and accepted professional norms. However, the
model may not be appropriate in cases where professional advice is ren-
dered for the purpose of marketing a product to third parties. In those
cases, a more general "hearer centered" theory, akin to the commercial
speech doctrine, may be appropriate.
A. Caselaw Concerning Professional Speech
1. Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the tension between freedom of
speech and the government's authority to regulate professions in the
1985 case Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission.224 The case
arose from an attempt by the SEC under the Investment Advisors Act of
1940 to enjoin a former investment advisor, whose registration had been
revoked because of criminal activity, from publishing investment news-
letters and a chart service. 225 The Court held that the publishing activity
could not be enjoined because it fell within the Act's exemption for "the
publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or fi-
nancial publication of general and regular circulation. ' ' 226 In so holding,
the Court distinguished between the provision of personalized advice,
based on a fiduciary relationship to a specific client, and the publication
of generic and impersonal advice or information:
[T]he petitioners' publications do not fit within the central purpose
of the Act because they do not offer individualized advice attuned to
any specific portfolio or to any client's particular needs. On the con-
trary, they circulate for sale to the public at large in a free, open
market-a public forum in which typically anyone may express his
views.
227
224.472 U.S. 181 (1985).
225. Id. at 183-86. The newsletters included commentary about the markets, reviews of market
indicators and investment strategies, and specific recommendations for buying, selling, or holding
specific investments, and advertised a hotline for current information.
226. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(i 1)(D).
227. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 208 (footnote omitted).
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Justice White's concurrence concluded that the statute permitted
regulation of the activity and considered whether the regulation violated
the First Amendment.228 The concurrence took a broad view of govern-
ment's power to regulate professions, opining that such power "is not
lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech., 229 However,
the concurrence stated, the government's authority to restrict entry into
professions through licensing "has never been extended to encompass the
licensing of speech per se or of the press .... At some point, a measure
is no longer a regulation of a profession but a regulation of speech or of
the press; beyond that point, the statute must survive the level of scrutiny
demanded by the First Amendment." 230 The concurrence, like the major-
ity opinion, based the limits of permissible regulation on the distinction
between whether a professional offers personal advice and purports to
exercise judgment on the client's behalf in light of the client's individual
circumstances.
231
Applying this distinction, the concurrence concluded that "[t]he ap-
plication of the Act's enforcement provisions to prevent unregistered
persons from engaging in the business of publishing investment advice
for the benefit of any who would purchase their publications ... is a di-
rect restraint on freedom of speech and of the press subject to the search-
ing scrutiny called for by the First Amendment.,
232
2. Joslin v. Secretary of the Department of the Treasury
Though both the majority opinion and the concurrence in Lowe
based the standard for permissible governmental regulation of profes-
sional speech on whether the communication was personalized and given
within a fiduciary-like relationship, 233 neither opinion sought to define
this standard further. One of the first cases to attempt a further definition,
Joslin v. Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, 234 arose in con-
nection with former Section 10.33. The plaintiff tax lawyer in Joslin
challenged former Section 10.33 on the grounds that it limited his ability
to give legal advice and opinions regarding taxation and his ability to
228. Id. at 226-27 (White, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 228.
230. Id. at 229-30.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 233. The concurrence concluded that, even if the newsletters were treated as having
only the lesser protection of commercial speech, the injunction would be found overbroad; thus, it
was not necessary to determine whether the newsletters had full First Amendment protection or only
commercial speech protection. Id. at 234-35.
233. See supra notes 229-31.
234. 616 F. Supp. 1023 (1985), vacated, 832 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1987).
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communicate advice to the public. 235 The taxpayer argued that, because
the rules applied to opinions directed to third parties, they could not be
justified as professional regulation under the standard articulated in
Lowe.
236
The Joslin court observed that former Section 10.33 followed the
professional guidelines of Formal Opinion 346 and noted the general
power of the state to impose restrictions on professions even if the inci-
dental effect is to abridge freedom of speech.237 The court followed Jus-
tice White's concurrence, finding that the relevant distinction is whether
there was a "personal nexus between professional and client."238 The
court then concluded that, although former Section 10.33 applied only to
tax shelter opinions addressed to third parties, there was nevertheless a
personal nexus between the attorney and the promoter for whom the
opinion was prepared:
The attorney is charged with making factual determinations about a
tax scheme. In order to do so the attorney must develop a personal
relationship with his client. The tax shelter opinion purports to be
the judgment of a practitioner exercised on behalf of a particular in-
dividual or corporation with whom he is directly acquainted. 239
The Joslin court further held that, even if the rendering of tax shelter
opinions constituted speech, it was commercial speech; thus, the regula-
tions were required to satisfy only the Constitutional guidelines for the
restriction of false and misleading commercial speech.2 40 Applying these
standards, the court concluded that "the regulations contained in Sections
10.33 . . . are not abridgements of constitutionally protected speech but
are regulations governing the standard of practice of professionals., 241
The court implied that, if the regulation of professional speech satisfies
the minimum Constitutional standards for the state's exercise of its po-
lice powers, any such regulation is permissible. Joslin thereby went sub-
stantially beyond the Supreme Court's decision in Lowe. Because the
District Court's decision was vacated on appeal for lack of jurisdic-
242tion, Joslin has no precedential value; nevertheless,'the analysis in Jos-
235. Id. at 1025.
236. Id. at 1027.
237. Id. at 1026 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)); Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889).
238. Joslin, 616 F. Supp. at 1027 (citing Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 232
(1985)).
239. Id.
240. Id. The application of the commercial speech doctrine to marketed tax shelter opinions is
discussed infra Part IV.A.6.B.
241. Id.
242. Joslin v. Sec'y of the Dep't of the Treasury, 832 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1987).
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lin reflects one pole in the debate over First Amendment restrictions on
the regulation of professional speech.
3. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada
The Supreme Court has returned to the issue of regulation of pro-
fessional speech a number of times since Lowe. In Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada,243 the plaintiff criminal defense attorney had given a press con-
ference shortly after his client's indictment for alleged theft where he
asserted, among other things, that his client was innocent and that a po-
lice detective expected to be a prosecution witness had in fact committed
the theft.244 The state bar subsequently disciplined the lawyer under a
professional rule prohibiting a lawyer from making a public statement
about a pending case where the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the statement will have a substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing the court proceeding.245 The lawyer challenged the discipline on
First Amendment grounds. In a fragmented decision, the Court held that,
though the particular rule under which the lawyer was disciplined was
unconstitutionally vague, the First Amendment generally permits courts
to impose such restrictions on lawyers' statements concerning pending
cases. 246 The Court declined to subject such restrictions to the more de-
manding standards for restrictions on media statements, which may not
be restricted by a court absent a clear and present danger of causing a
malfunction in the criminal justice system.247
In so holding, the Court emphasized that the lawyer's role is an es-
248sential part of the justice system, even outside the courtroom. 8 Because
of this role, a range of restrictions had been permitted on lawyers'
speech, including limitations on advertising and solicitation.249 In each
case, the Court had "engaged in a balancing process, weighing the
State's interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a
lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at is-
sue."250 The "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard was
constitutional for attorneys because "it is designed to protect the integrity
243. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
244. Id. at 1041-47.
245. Id. at 1033. The rule was based on MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2003).
246. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1065-76.
247. Id. at 1069-71.
248. Id. at 1071.
249. Id.at 1073 (citing Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S.
91 (1990); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977)).
250. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1073.
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and fairness of a State's judicial system, and it imposes only narrow and
necessary limitations on lawyers' speech."25'
Gentile may be viewed narrowly as establishing guidelines for the
regulation by courts of lawyers appearing before them in pending cases.
However, the decision may also be viewed as a template for the regula-
tion of speech by professionals that participate in crucial public func-
tions. Under the Court's analysis, the mere fact that a professional par-
ticipates in an important public function is not sufficient to permit limita-
tions on the professional's speech. Rather, the speech must present a
clearly defined and realistic threat to the functioning of the system.
Moreover, any restriction on the speech must be designed to address the
threat and be narrowly tailored to limit only threatening speech.
4. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,252
the Court considered state restrictions on the provision of abortions, in-
cluding a requirement that, at least 24 hours before performing a non-
emergency abortion, a physician inform a patient of the nature of the
procedure, the health risks of abortion and childbirth, and the probable
gestational age of the unborn child.253 The restrictions also required the
physician or a qualified non-physician to inform the woman of the avail-
ability of printed materials published by the state that described the fetus
and provided information about medical assistance for childbirth, obtain-
ing child support from the father, and agencies which provide adoption
254and other services as alternatives to abortion. No abortion could be
performed unless the woman certified in writing that she had been in-
formed of the availability of the printed materials and had been provided
with them if she so chose.255
In a fragmented decision, the Court upheld the information re-
quirements, though none of the opinions was supported by a majority of
the Justices and only the opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Souter, considered the First Amendment. Justice
O'Connor's opinion, contradicting certain prior decisions, 256 concluded
that the information requirements did not unduly burden the right to ob-
tain an abortion, in light of the state's substantial and legitimate interests
251. Id. at 1075.
252. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
253. Id. at 881.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986);
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
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in protecting the physical and psychological health of the mother and the
life of the unborn child: the information to be provided was truthful and
designed to further the state's interests by allowing a patient to make a
fully informed decision.2 57 The opinion noted that compliance was not
required if the physician could demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that he reasonably believed furnishing the information would
have had a severely adverse effect on the patient's physical or mental
health.258 Accordingly, the opinion held that the "statute does not prevent
the physician from exercising his or her medical judgment."
259
Justice O'Connor's opinion treated the question of professional
speech as secondary to the question of state burdens on abortion, but
nevertheless included a consideration of whether a physician has a First
Amendment right not to provide information in the manner required by
the statute. According to the opinion, while "the physician's First
Amendment rights not to speak [were] implicated," such rights were im-
plicated "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State., 260 Accordingly, the information
requirements were found constitutional.261 It should be noted, however,
that Casey involved a requirement to provide information, not a prohibi-
tion on speech. Further, Justice O'Connor's conclusion was dependent
on a finding that the state's requirements did not prohibit a physician
from exercising professional judgment.
262
5. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez
The most recent Supreme Court consideration of First Amendment
limitations on the regulation of professional speech occurred in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 263 which arose from a challenge to a Federal
statute prohibiting lawyers receiving funding from the Legal Services
Corporation from undertaking any representation that involved an effort
to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare laws. 264 In Rust v. Sul-
livan, the Court upheld legislation prohibiting federal funds for family
planning clinics if clinic doctors discussed abortion with their patients.265
257. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
258. Id. at 883-84.
259. Id. at 884. The opinion also held that the requirements did not violate the doctor-patient
relationship. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 881-87.
262. Id. at 884.
263. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
264. Id. at 538-39. If the presence of constitutional or statutory challenges became apparent
while a lawyer was engaged in a representation, regulations under the statute required the lawyer to
withdraw. Id. at 539.
265. 500 U.S. 173, 193-95 (1991).
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The Velazquez Court distinguished Rust, explaining that the federal pro-
gram in Rust had been intended to further a specific government message
and that viewpoint-based restrictions were therefore permitted. 266 In con-
trast, the Legal Services program was designed to facilitate private
speech, not to promote a governmental message.26 7 In this circumstance,
restricting lawyers' speech "distorts the legal system by altering the tra-
ditional role of attorneys.' 268 Accordingly, the government "may not de-
sign a subsidy to effect this serious and fundamental restriction on advo-
cacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary., 269 By seeking to
prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to
the courts, the statute "prohibit[ed] speech and expression upon which
courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power."
270
The chief contribution of Velazquez was to emphasize that a restric-
tion on lawyers' speech may distort the legal system by altering the "tra-
ditional role of attorneys., 27 A finding of such distortion of the lawyer's
advocacy role was one of the main bases for the Court's holding that the
Legal Services restriction was unconstitutional.2 2
6. Conant v. Walters
In Conant v. Walters,273 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld, on First Amendment grounds, an injunction against the federal
government's law enforcement actions against California physicians.274
The controversy arose from California's enactment of legislation that
decriminalized the use of marijuana for limited medical purposes and
immunized physicians from prosecution under state law for recommend-
266. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541-43.
267. "Congress funded LSC grantees to provide attorneys to represent the interests of indigent
clients .... The attorney defending the decision to deny [welfare] benefits will deliver the govern-
ment's message in the litigation. The LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the behalf of his or her pri-
vate, indigent client." Id. at 542.
268. Id. at 544. The Court compared such distortion to restrictions on editorial content and
decisions by broadcast networks, citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(1998); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984), and restrictions on editorial
content in student newspapers, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995).
269. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544.
270. Id. at 545. The Court was particularly concerned with the fact that the prohibition "sifts
out cases presenting constitutional challenges in order to insulate the Government's laws from judi-
cial inquiry." Id. at 546. The Court did not view the ability of a funded lawyer to withdraw from
representation as avoiding an unconstitutional restriction on speech, particularly because the indigent
client was unlikely to find other counsel. Id. at 547.
271. Id. at 544.
272. Id. at 543-47.
273. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
274. Id. at 632.
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ing or approving of the use of marijuana for such purposes. In re-
sponse, the federal government promulgated a policy stating that a doc-
tor's recommending or prescribing marijuana was not consistent with the
public interest within the meaning of the Controlled Substances Act and
that such actions would lead to revocation of the physician's authority to
prescribe controlled substances.276 Various parties challenged the policy
on First Amendment grounds and obtained a permanent injunction that
prohibited the federal government from revoking the controlled sub-
stances registration of a doctor or from conducting an investigation that
might lead to such revocation, solely on the basis of the physician's rec-
ommendation, based on sincere medical judgment, that a patient use
medical marijuana.277
The Ninth Circuit noted that where a physician actually prescribed
marijuana or made a recommendation intended to facilitate access to
marijuana, the injunction did not bar the federal government from prose-
cuting the physician for aiding and abetting a violation of or a conspiracy
to violate federal law.278 However, a doctor could not be viewed as aid-
ing and abetting or participating in a conspiracy merely because the doc-
tor anticipated that the patient would respond to the doctor's recommen-
dation by obtaining marijuana in violation of federal law.279
The court rejected a series of government arguments. The govern-
ment had argued that restrictions on physicians' First Amendment rights
are permissible because medicine is a regulated profession; the court,
rejecting the argument, responded that professional speech "may be enti-
tled to 'the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer."' '280 The
court also rejected the government's argument that a doctor-patient dis-
cussion about marijuana might lead the patient to make a bad decision,
noting that the First Amendment does not permit restrictions on the
communication of truthful information because of decisions such infor-
mation may lead a recipient to make. 28' Finally, the court rejected the
275. Id.
276. Id. at 632-33.
277. Id. at 633-34.
278. Id. at 635-36.
279. Id. at 636.
280. Id. at 637 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995)).
281. Id. at 637 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002), in which
the Supreme Court, in holding unconstitutional rules that prohibited physicians and pharmacists
from advertising compounded drugs, rejected the government's argument that "people would make
bad decisions if given truthful information about compounded drugs").
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argument that a doctor's recommending marijuana may encourage illegal
conduct.
2 82
The court in Conant concluded that the federal policy restricted a
particular viewpoint-the view that medical marijuana would likely help
a specific patient-and that such content-based restrictions on speech are
"'presumptively invalid.' ' 283 Following Velazquez, the court further con-
cluded that the federal policy "'alter[s] the traditional role' of medical
professionals by 'prohibit[ing] speech necessary to the proper function-
ing of those systems.'
' 284
Conant addresses both the relatively narrow issue of viewpoint-
based speech as well as broader principles. The decision sets a basic
threshold by affirming the First Amendment protection of speech that
does not in itself constitute illegal conduct.2 85 The decision also recog-
nizes that communications between a professional and a client are enti-
tled to strong First Amendment protections, notwithstanding that the pro-
fessions are subject to regulation, and follows Velazquez in stating that
the scope of the First Amendment protection of professional speech is
related to the traditional role and purpose of the profession. 28 6 Finally,
the decision refuses to accept restrictions on truthful professional speech
based on the possibility that the recipient may use the information to
make bad decisions or engage in illegal conduct.
2 87
B. The Professional Speech Model
Though a comprehensive analysis of the philosophical underpin-
nings of the First Amendment and the function and meaning of profes-
sional speech is beyond the scope of this Article, the court opinions dis-
cussed above suggest a model, supported by commentators, for analyzing
282. Id. at 638. The court noted that a similar justification had been rejected in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (finding that the First Amendment prohibited application of the
Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 1996 to virtual child pornography).
283. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).
284. Id. at 638 (quoting Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001)). The court
also found the Federal policy impermissible because it was a restriction on speech whose meaning
depends upon the meaning attributed to it by the hearer. Id. at 639 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
285. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (A preliminary
injunction was issued against enforcement of Section 4734 of Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which
made it illegal to counsel or assist an individual to dispose of certain assets to qualify for Medicaid
benefits; Federal government did not defend the constitutionality of the provision.). See also Magee
v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 2d 161, 162 (D.R.I. 2000) (The "United States does not dispute that
Section 4734 is 'plainly unconstitutional.':').
286. Conant, 309 F.3d at 638.
287. Id. at 637-38.
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the regulation of professional speech. 288 This model identifies profes-
sional speech as a personalized communication given in the context of a
fiduciary-like relationship between a person who adheres to a shared
body of professional knowledge and values and that person's client.
289
Such speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. 290 This protection
differs from the protection given to the press and "street comer" speech
on the one hand and the protection given to commercial speech on the
other.2 91
The model defines permissible regulation of professional speech
largely by reference to the role of the profession in society and accepted
professional norms.292 Professional speech may be prohibited where it
involves illegal conduct, presents a clear and realistic threat to the proper
functioning of the profession or the institutions with which the profession
interacts, or deviates from accepted professional norms. 29 3 However, any
such prohibition must be narrowly tailored to address only the illegal
conduct, the specific threat to the system, or the deviation from profes-
sional norms.2 9 4 In addition, professional speech may be regulated for the
purpose of furthering a legitimate State policy, provided that the regula-
tion does not distort the usual functioning of the profession based on ac-
288. See Halberstam, supra note 2, at 792-828 (analyzing professional speech under theories
of economics, culture, democracy, and liberty, and arguing that professional speech should be evalu-
ated by reference to the social context in which it is expressed); Kry, supra note 2, at 957-63 (ana-
lyzing professional speech under the "marketplace of ideas" theory and the "self governance" the-
ory); Wendel, supra note 2, at 404-23 (analyzing lawyers' speech by reference to the values of
discovery of truth, democracy, dissent, and self-fulfillment).
289. See Halberstam, supra note 2, at 839-44; Kry, supra note 2, at 907-11.
290. See Halberstam, supra note 2, at 838 ("Justice White's rationality review, as adopted by
four members of the Court in Casey, fails to give professional speech its due. At a minimum, profes-
sional speech should be accorded no less protection than commercial speech"); Wendel, supra note
2, at 359 ("Gentile does not revive the long-discredited right/privilege distinction .... It merely
makes the less controversial constitutional point that in some kinds of state-established forums,
speakers' rights may be limited by reasonable government interests."); Berg, supra note 2, at 170
stating that
Casey's conclusion that physician speech should be deprived of full First Amendment
protection because 'it is subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State' turns
traditional First Amendment methodology on its head. Rather than focusing on the neces-
sity of limiting speech under certain circumstances, the traditional method for determin-
ing whether speech is protected in the first instance is to assess whether the expression
facilitates First Amendment values. It is the function of the constitutional standard of re-
view to protect the speech when it facilitates those values, and to permit government
regulation in those exceptional instances when those values are outweighed by the ex-
pression's negative impact.
291. See Halberstam, supra note 2, at 773-76; Wendel, supra note 2, at 381-82.
292. See Halberstam, supra note 2, at 834-35; Wendel, supra note 2, at 385-86.
293. See Halberstam, supra note 2, at 844-49, 867-68.
294. Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991).
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cepted usage or prevent the exercise of professional judgment. 9 5 Profes-
sional speech may not be prohibited merely because the client may use
the information to make a bad choice or to engage in illegal conduct,
provided that the professional does not participate in or further the illegal
conduct.296 Likewise, a professional may not be required to make state-
ments that are false or misleading.297
An obvious question regarding the professional speech model is
whether it should apply to professional speech used to market a product
to a third party, such as a tax opinion used to market a tax shelter. In ad-
dressing this question, it is useful to consider whether a lawyer's opinion
constitutes "commercial speech" and, if so, how the professional speech
model interacts with the commercial speech doctrine. Both courts and
commentators have noted that the boundaries of commercial speech are
unclear.298 However, even in the broadest formulations, "commercial
speech" would apply only to communications made by or on behalf of a
seller to a potential purchaser and having some connection to the pro-
posed sale. 299 Thus, in the case of a marketed tax shelter, the commercial
speech doctrine would not apply to an opinion given by a lawyer to a
client that is a potential purchaser that addresses the client's tax treat-
ment, because the lawyer is not the seller of the shelter or the seller's
agent. 300 Likewise, the commercial speech doctrine will not apply where
the client is the tax shelter promoter and the lawyer provides advice to
the promoter regarding the tax treatment of a potential purchaser, if the
lawyer's advice is not addressed to the potential purchaser and not in-
tended by the lawyer to be shown to the potential purchaser or incorpo-
rated in marketing materials.
295. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543-45 (2001); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882-84 (1992).
296. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2002).
297. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
298. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) ("ambiguities may exist at the
margins of the category of commercial speech"); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (mentioning the "difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin
commercial speech in a distinct category"); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup.
Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (hoting that the "precise bounds of the category of... com-
mercial speech" are unclear); Post, supra note 2, at 5-25; Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the
Running-but-Going-Nowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 383 (2005); Scott
Wellikoff, Note, Mixed Speech: Inequities that Result from an Ambiguous Doctrine, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 159, 174-79 (2004).
299. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983) (commercial
speech generally characterized by advertising format, product reference and commercial motiva-
tion); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256-57 (Cal. 2002) (speech considered to be in advertising
format if message is directed to an audience that will be influenced, or likely influenced, to engage
in a commercial transaction).
300. See Post, supra note 2, at 23 (The "doctrine stops short of commercial communications
between persons deemed to be involved in relationships of dependence or reliance.").
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Where the client is the tax shelter promoter and asks the lawyer to
prepare advice for a third party investor in the shelter, there is a facial
appeal to viewing the shelter as the product and the lawyer's advice as a
form of advertising; in this view, the commercial speech doctrine would
apply. However, even in this case, the lawyer's obligation to exercise
independent professional judgment, speak truthfully, and disclose rele-
vant facts distinguishes the lawyer's advice from typical advertising,
which has no such internally imposed obligations.
C. "Hearer-Centered" First Amendment Theory
The objective of the commercial speech doctrine is to ensure the
free flow of truthful rather than misleading commercial information and
to permit reasonable consumer protection and similar regulations. 30 1 If
professional speech is directed to third parties, it may be more appropri-
ate to apply a "hearer-centered" First Amendment theory similar to that
developed by Burt Neuborne in The First Amendment and Government
Regulation of Capital Markets.3 °2 The purpose of such a theory is to en-
sure that the recipient, in this case the recipient of the lawyer's advice,
receives information that enhances his ability to make an informed and
autonomous choice.30 3 Under such a theory, the government would be
free to prohibit false or misleading speech or speech that promotes an
unlawful choice. Moreover, the government would be free to require the
inclusion in communications of information that helps the recipient make
an informed choice. However, absent a compelling governmental need
and narrowly tailored measures that address such need, the government
could not prohibit the communication of truthful, non-misleading infor-
mation, regardless of the risk that the recipient would use the information
to make an undesirable choice, nor could it impose inaccurate prophylac-
tic rules branding certain categories of speech as inherently false or mis-
leading.30 4
301. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72
(1976).
Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake..
. . Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but
only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with
this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State
from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
302. See Neubome, supra note 2, at 28-40.
303. Id.
304. The Supreme Court's professional solicitation cases have considered in detail the applica-
tion of overbroad and prophylactic rules to commercial speech by lawyers. In the non-commercial
context, a person generally may challenge a speech regulation on the grounds that it prohibits pro-
tected speech, even though the person's speech itself is not protected. See generally RONALD D.
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The "hearer-centered" theory has several elements in common with
the professional speech model described above. Both theories aim prin-
cipally to protect the recipient's interest in receiving the advice for the
purpose of making an informed and autonomous choice within the scope
of the recipient's rights. Both theories permit the censoring of speech that
promotes an illegal objective or is deemed actually or professionally
false or misleading, and both permit reasonable compelled disclosures
provided that the disclosures are not themselves false or misleading. Un-
der both theories, the possibility that the recipient may use the informa-
tion to make a bad choice is not a legitimate basis for restricting speech.
However, the professional speech model focuses on the specific so-
cietal role of the lawyer, the relevant professional norms, and the exer-
cise of professional judgment. In contrast, the "hearer-centered" theory,
while regarding the professional and societal context as relevant because
it helps define the interests of the recipient of advice, does not protect the
professional role, professional institutions, or the exercise of professional
judgment as values in themselves.
V. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
TO THE CIRCULAR 230 OPINION REQUIREMENTS
The obligations imposed by Circular 230 on lawyers rendering tax
shelter opinions consist of (1) obligations regarding the general structure
of the advice and the issues that must be addressed, which generally are
neutral as to the viewpoint expressed by the advice ("viewpoint-neutral"
requirements); and (2) obligations regarding the method of analysis, the
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.8 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing
the overbreadth doctrine); Richard H. Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853
(1991); Wendel, supra note 2, at 382-91 (discussing the application of the overbreadth doctrine to
limits on lawyer speech); Miller, supra note 217, at 198-201. The Court has held that the justifica-
tion for the application of overbreadth analysis "applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial
context." Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977). The Court also has permitted the
application of overbroad rules to otherwise protected commercial speech based on the prophylactic
effect of the rule. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 463-64 (1978) (prohibi-
tion against in-person solicitation by lawyers); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635
(1995) (prohibition against targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for thirty
days following an accident or disaster). However, the Court has only permitted such prophylactic
rules in circumstances in which the rule is narrowly tailored to achieving a substantial governmental
interest. Id. at 632-34. The Court consistently has rejected justifications for prophylactic rules based
on the potential effects of providing information to the public regarding potential legal rights. See,
e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 375-77 (rejecting justification of ban on lawyer advertising on the ground
that it would stir up litigation); accord, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642-46 (1985). Conversely, in cases where the Court has upheld prophylactic
rules, it has emphasized the fact that such rules do not materially interfere with lawyers' communica-
tions with potential clients regarding their legal rights. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458; Went For It, 515
U.S. at 632-34.
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conclusions reached in certain advice, and disclosures that must accom-
pany the advice and that require the expression of specific viewpoints or
facts ("viewpoint-based" requirements). Application of the professional
speech model and the "hearer-centered" theory described above to these
rules raises a number of serious First Amendment concerns. Those con-
cems could be addressed by a number of specific changes to the Circular
230 opinion standards for non-marketed and marketed opinions.
A. Viewpoint-Neutral Requirements
As discussed above, both Section 10.35 and Section 10.37 impose
due diligence standards; 30 5 Section 10.35 also requires a practitioner to
relate the applicable law to the relevant facts, to consider all "significant
federal tax issues," to provide a conclusion as to the likelihood that the
taxpayer will prevail with respect to each issue, and to provide an overall
conclusion as to the tax treatment of the transaction. 30 6 The significant
First Amendment questions are (1) whether the government may prohibit
the rendering of written advice that does not reflect one or more of those
analyses; and (2) to what extent the government may impose standards
for conducting the analyses themselves.
The requirements in Section 10.35 are intended to prevent hypo-
thetical, inaccurate or incomplete advice.30 7 However, in certain circum-
stances the advice rendered by a tax lawyer perforce will be objectively
inaccurate, hypothetical, or incomplete. Bad advice may be a result of
inaccurate assumptions or hypothetical or limited client questions. Under
the legal ethics rules, the ability of a lawyer to give limited advice de-
pends on the context of the request. Lawyers and clients are given broad
latitude to define the scope of the lawyer's advice, subject to standards of
reasonableness.
In certain circumstances the rules require more extensive advice. A
lawyer advising on a tax return position may not recommend a position
without determining relevant facts, placing them in a legal framework,
identifying relevant issues, and reaching conclusions on the issues and an
overall conclusion that the position has a reasonable possibility of suc-
cess if litigated. 30 8 A tax opinion reaching a conclusion on a specific set
of facts must identify relevant facts, relate them to applicable law, iden-
tify and consider the relevant issues, and reach conclusions appropriate
to the purpose and expected use of the opinion. 309 A lawyer preparing a
305. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
306. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c) (2006).
307. See supra note 30.
308. Formal Opinion 85-352, supra note 156.
309. DRAFT STATEMENT, supra note 163.
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tax opinion that is used to market tax shelters must conduct reasonable
factual due diligence, relate the law to the facts, consider all material
federal tax issues and, where possible, provide specific and general con-
clusions about separate issues and the overall tax treatment of the trans-
action.31 °
However, Section 10.35 has a broader scope than the ethical rules.
Formal Opinion 346 applies only to "tax shelter opinions," which are
limited to broadly marketed opinions or tax disclosure in offering or
marketing materials.3 ' It does not apply where advice is rendered solely
to the offeror, the involvement of the lawyer is not publicized, or a tax
shelter transaction is directly negotiated by a small group of investors
having their own tax counsel. Formal Opinion 85-352 applies to advice
regarding a tax return reporting position.312 It is true, as noted in the Spe-
cial Task Force Report, that the opinion would also apply to advice re-
garding tax return positions prior to the actual preparation of the return,
including advice in structuring transactions.3 3 However, Formal Opinion
85-352 does not clearly require a lawyer to approach every planning
question, no matter how preliminary or hypothetical, based on the as-
sumption that the lawyer's advice will be reflected in a tax return.
Even where advice is related to a return position, a foreshortened
analysis may be permissible. For example, a client may request advice
concerning a specific rule that is only one of a number of elements in
determining a return reporting position. In these circumstances, the law-
yer will have an obligation to identify all the relevant facts regarding the
application of the rule within the context of all known facts. However,
the lawyer will not be required by Formal Opinion 85-352 to engage in a
full analysis leading to an overall conclusion regarding the tax treatment
of the position.
Section 10.35 requires a full-fledged analysis in many situations
where the ethical rules do not. In these cases, the First Amendment pro-
fessional speech model described above requires consideration of a num-
ber of questions. Does the absence of a full-fledged analysis constitute
participation in illegal conduct, present a clear and realistic threat to the
tax system, or deviate from accepted professional norms? If so, are the
requirements of Section 10.35 narrowly tailored to address the illegality,
the threat to the tax system, or the deviation from professional norms?
310. Formal Opinion 346, supra note 35.
311. Id.
312. Formal Opinion 85-352, supra note 156.
313. Sax et al., supra note 160, at 638. See also WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 502
("Since advising on return positions is inherent in most tax planning, the application of Opinion 85-
352 would appear to apply to tax planning by logical extension.").
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Finally, do the requirements of Section 10.35 further a legitimate gov-
ernment policy in a manner that does not distort the usual functioning of
the profession based on accepted usage, or prevent the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment?
1. Harmful Effects of Tax Advice
There is no reason to think that rendering written advice without a
full-fledged analysis will in itself constitute participation in illegal con-
duct. Likewise, based on the ethical rules and practices discussed above,
there is little reason to think that the absence of a full-fledged analysis
represents a deviation from accepted professional norms.314 Arguably,
limited-scope written tax advice represents a clear and meaningful threat
to the system because it facilitates transactions motivated by tax avoid-
ance, which themselves are threats. It could also be argued that the cov-
ered opinion requirements for a full-fledged opinion are directly related
to the goal of discouraging inappropriate tax avoidance by ensuring that
the recipient of the advice receives a full analysis of the likelihood that
the transaction will or will not achieve the desired tax objectives.3 15
314. It might be argued that the covered opinion standards of Section 10.35 reflect accepted
professional norms because they reflect recommendations of the ABA Section of Taxation. See ABA
SECTION OF TAXATION, REPORT TO AMEND 31 C.F.R. PART 10, TREASURY DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR
230, TO DEAL WITH "MORE LIKELY THAN NOT" OPINIONS RELATING TO TAX SHELTER ITEMS OF
CORPORATIONS (Nov. 1, 1999), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 2, 1999); ABA SECTION OF
TAXATION, COMMENTS REGARDING "PRE-OPINION OPINIONS" RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX
SHELTER ITEMS (Sept. 15, 2000), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 21, 2000); ABA SECTION
OF TAXATION, ADMINISTRATIVE RECOMMENDATION REGARDING REGULATIONS GOVERNING
PRACTICE BEFORE THE IRS (Aug. 13, 200 1), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 15, 2001); ABA
SECTION OF TAXATION, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CIRCULAR 230 ABA SECTION OF TAXATION
RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 24, 2002), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (May 6, 2002). However, the
ABA Section of Taxation recognized that many of the concepts in its recommendations "are novel
and untried." ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CIRCULAR 230 ABA SECTION
OF TAXATION RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 24, 2002), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (May 6, 2002).
The ABA Section of Taxation has since concluded that "the regulations are producing undesirable
consequences at a level that is disproportionate to the associated benefits to the tax system." Letter
from Dennis B. Drapkin to Mark W. Everson, Donald L. Korb, Eric Solomon, Cono R. Namorato
(Dec. 5, 2005), in TAX NOTES TODAY (Dec. 6, 2005).
315. See ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CIRCULAR 230 ABA SECTION
OF TAXATION RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 24,2002), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (May 6, 2002).
Arguably, the goals of Circular 230 concerning [penalty-protection opinions] could be
achieved by making Circular 230 applicable to, and only to, opinions offered for pur-
poses of penalty protection. Notwithstanding this, however, the Recommendation makes
Circular 230 applicable to any opinion covering a section 10.35 transaction, as defined,
regardless of whether the opinion is intended to create penalty protection. This is because
... [w]e believe that the attractiveness of abusive transactions will be reduced if practi-
tioners are required to disclose all relevant issues and risks to taxpayers. This is appropri-
ate in our current environment despite the fact that some transactions that meet the
heightened due diligence procedures contained in section 10.35 are substantively sound
under today's rules.
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As discussed above, however, a tax-avoidance motivation does not
necessarily prevent a transaction from lawfully achieving the desired tax
benefits. 31 6 Therefore, the government must argue either that tax-
avoidance transactions are frequently invalid, or that the threat to the sys-
tem comes from the combination of the transaction's tax-avoidance pur-
pose with the uncertainty over its tax results. Under the First Amend-
ment, it is difficult to justify regulating speech regarding a class of trans-
actions because of the frequency with which invalid transactions occur
within that class; if a meaningful amount of legitimate speech exists
within the class, the regulation must fall.31 7 It is true that, where the rules
are not clear, some taxpayers will interpret the uncertainty in their favor
and seek to structure transactions to fall within these uncertain rules; tax
advice regarding such transactions will facilitate this behavior. 318 How-
ever, the potential for such manipulation has not been held sufficient
grounds for regulating a class of speech that includes legitimate speech.
It might be argued, based on Gentile,31 9 that the test for regulating
professional speech does not require certainty that the speech will harm
the system. However, the ethical rule considered in Gentile specifically
targeted statements that "have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," and the Court emphasized the
specific connection between the lawyer's speech and a threat to the in-
tegrity and fairness of the judicial system. 320 In contrast, Section 10.35
applies indiscriminately to speech regarding valid and invalid transac-
tions. It is doubtful that a court would uphold a regulation of professional
speech based on the nonspecific threat that, as a result of such speech,
taxpayers and their lawyers may structure transactions to exploit ambi-
guities in the tax rules.
321
Id.
316. See supra note 67. Likewise, the fact that a transaction has been designated by the IRS as
a listed transaction does not in itself mean that the transaction is invalid.
317. See supra note 304.
318. See Caplin, supra note 203, at 976 (quoting Charles Grassley, R-lowa, as observing that
"At the heart of every abusive tax shelter is a tax lawyer or accountant").
319. Gentile v. State Bar ofNev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
320. "While supported by the substantial state interest in preventing prejudice to an adjudica-
tive proceeding by those who have a duty to protect its integrity, the Rule is limited on its face to
preventing only speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing that proceeding."
Id. at 1076.
321. The mere fact that such transactions are likely to give rise to litigation is not a threat that
would justify the speech regulation. As the Supreme Court noted in the context of attorney advertis-
ing:
That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be regretted; rather, it is
an attribute of our system ofjustice in which we ought to take pride. The State is not enti-
tled to interfere with that access by denying its citizens accurate information about their
legal rights. Accordingly, it is not sufficient justification for the discipline imposed on
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This justification for regulating speech may not be appropriate even
where written tax advice concerns an issue that ultimately is determined
in favor of the IRS. Consider, for example, advice that correctly con-
cludes that (1) an issue is uncertain, (2) there is a realistic possibility that
the taxpayer will prevail, but (3) "more likely than not" the IRS will pre-
vail, and (4) if the IRS prevails, the taxpayer will incur a substantial un-
derstatement penalty. There is little in such advice that could be seen to
facilitate the improper tax avoidance. It is true that, by concluding that
the taxpayer has a realistic possibility of success, the advice enables the
taxpayer to assert the position on a tax return without risk of penalties for
fraud, negligence, or disregard of rules or regulations. However, until the
issue has been resolved, the taxpayer has the right to assert the position.
It is difficult to see how the tax system is threatened by advice that cor-
rectly assesses the taxpayer's rights.322
Even if advice threatens the system by improperly concluding that a
structure will provide tax benefits, are the requirements in Section 10.35
for a full-fledged opinion narrowly tailored to address the specific threat?
There are two ways in which such a full-fledged opinion might help
avoid structured transactions that improperly claim tax benefits: (1) by
giving a full description of the factual and legal context of a transaction
and identifying its strengths and weaknesses, an opinion could, if seen by
the IRS, assist the IRS in challenging an improper transaction; (2) by
identifying risks and penalties, the recipient might be less likely to claim
improper benefits.
The requirements cannot be justified based on the possibility that an
opinion will be seen by the IRS. While opinions sometimes will be dis-
closed to the IRS, many remain privileged and undisclosed. Accordingly,
such requirements would not be narrowly tailored to a specific threat.
Even if the requirements were limited to opinions that are discoverable
by the IRS, this justification would be doubtful. Requiring a lawyer to
prepare an opinion in ways designed to assist the IRS in a future chal-
lenge would entail a serious distortion of the lawyer's professional role;
and, as a practical matter, taxpayers and lawyers would, absent some
specific purpose such as penalty protection, avoid such advice whenever
possible.
The requirements also cannot be justified on the grounds that they
will discourage taxpayers from taking improper positions. The "ground
up" analysis required by Section 10.35-identification of facts, relation
appellant that his truthful and nondeceptive advertising had a tendency to or did in fact
encourage others to file lawsuits.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985).
322. See Trucksess, supra note 203, at 755.
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of law to the facts, a reasoned conclusion regarding each significant fed-
eral tax issue, and an overall reasoned conclusion, with separate state-
ments of assumptions relied upon and representations by the taxpayer-
will lead to the preparation of comprehensive opinions. However, such
comprehensiveness is not necessary or even desirable if the purpose is to
prevent taxpayers from taking improper positions. The objective could be
better achieved by requiring practitioners to properly address those issues
that are relevant to the purpose and expected use of the opinion, includ-
ing requirements that the practitioner consider all facts relevant to such
issues and all relevant legal aspects of each issue, reach correct conclu-
sions regarding the likelihood that each such issue will be resolved in the
taxpayer's favor, and address the likelihood that the client will incur pen-
alties if the client's position is not sustained.
2. Legitimate Government Policies
Another possible justification of the requirements is that they fur-
ther legitimate government policies and impose only minor burdens on
the lawyer-client relationship. Possible government policies include en-
suring that taxpayers not enter into tax-motivated transactions without a
full understanding of the risks and maintaining the public confidence in
the honesty and integrity of tax professionals.3 23
These purposes are undoubtedly legitimate. The concern is whether
the requirements achieve these ends and whether they improperly distort
the role of an attorney based on accepted practices. In one sense, taxpay-
ers will be better informed of the relevant risks by opinions that provide
a comprehensive analysis of every potential issue. However, such analy-
sis may not give taxpayers a meaningfully better understanding of the
risks.324 In particular, the low threshold for defining a significant federal
tax issue may require a lawyer to address relatively unimportant issues in
ways that dilute the lawyer's message regarding more important is-
sues.
325
The requirement that covered opinions address all significant fed-
eral tax issues and include comprehensive analyses of the strengths and
323. The preamble to Section 10.35 specifically refers to the goal of restoring, promoting and
maintaining the public's confidence in tax practitioners as a purpose for the "best practices" con-
tained in Section 10.33.
324. A similar issue arises in securities offering disclosures containing extensive discussions of
potential risks. Without guidance regarding the relative importance of various risks, the reader may
tend to discount the entire discussion.
325. One response is that Section 10.35 does not prevent the lawyer from highlighting the most
important issues. However, the argument that the covered opinion requirements ensure better-
informed taxpayers is not supported by a suggestion that the taxpayer need not read the entire opin-
ion.
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weaknesses of the taxpayer's position also significantly alters the role of
a lawyer providing advice to a client. Lawyers and clients may agree to
limit the scope of written advice for any number of reasons. The client
may want the benefit of the lawyer's judgment as to which issues are
most important. The client may have an independent knowledge of the
tax law and wish advice only on a specialized point. The client may not
want all the advice in writing because of a concern that the written ad-
vice may lose the protection of the attorney-client privilege. The client
may have a limited budget. A transaction may not be sufficiently devel-
oped to merit an in-depth analysis. There may be insufficient time to
prepare a comprehensive analysis. None of these reasons should deny the
client the right to receive advice regarding his legal rights and exposures.
For that reason, the ethical rules generally permit lawyers and clients to
agree on the scope of legal advice, provided that the client is informed
and the limitation does not prevent competent representation.
326
Even where the lawyer's advice is provided to a third party, the re-
quirements substantially expand the obligations of a lawyer in ways that
may prevent such advice from being rendered. This is particularly a con-
cern for advice rendered in connection with commercial negotiations be-
tween the client and a third party having its own tax counsel. There, the
lawyer's role is akin to that of an advocate, since the third party's tax
counsel normally will evaluate the lawyer's advice and make a recom-
mendation to the third party whether or not to accept such advice. There
are many legitimate reasons why the parties may not wish the lawyer to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the third party's tax position. 327 Nor
is a comprehensive analysis required under the ethical rules, which
merely require that the lawyer disclose to the third party any limitation
on the scope of the lawyer's investigation and that the lawyer not know-
ingly make a false statement of material law or fact.
328
While much of the distortion to a lawyer's typical role can be
avoided through the various "legending out" exclusions to the covered
opinion rules and the possibility, within the covered opinion rules, of
326. See supra notes 181-85, 188-89, and accompanying text.
327. The client typically will not wish to undertake this responsibility because of cost and
liability concerns, and because the client's relationship with the third party is principally commer-
cial. Even if the client were prepared to have its lawyer provide a comprehensive analysis, the law-
yer may not have sufficient information about the third party to permit such an analysis. The third
party may request that the lawyer provide advice only regarding the tax treatment of facts that are
better known to the client and the lawyer than to the third party. Also, the third party may be reluc-
tant to disclose commercially sensitive or private information to the lawyer, who generally would
have an ethical obligation to disclose those facts to the client. Finally, the third party may be reluc-
tant to have the lawyer prepare a comprehensive analysis because such analysis would not be cov-
ered by attorney-client privilege.
328. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
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providing a limited scope opinion, that is at best an incomplete response.
First, the "legending out" and limited scope exceptions are not available
in all circumstances: no "legending out" exclusion is available for written
advice regarding listed or principal purpose transactions, or opinions re-
garding significant purpose transactions that are subject to conditions of
confidentiality or contractual protection. 329 Likewise, a limited scope
opinion may not be provided in the case of a listed or principal purpose
transaction or a marketed opinion. The distortion of a lawyer's role is
just as likely in these cases as where a "legending out" exception is
available.
Moreover, there are problems with the legends themselves. As dis-
cussed above, the legends may be false, overbroad, or inappropriate for
the circumstances; 330 practitioners should not be required to make such
statements as a condition of avoiding the covered opinion requirements.
A lawyer's role is also distorted by the conditions for providing a limited
scope opinion, which, as discussed above, appear to place the lawyer in
the position of negotiating directly with the client over the scope of the
client's rights.33 1
Finally, it is not clear that the covered opinion requirements have
any meaningful connection to the level of public confidence in tax pro-
fessionals. It could just as well be argued that the covered opinion re-
quirements erode confidence among the informed public in their ability




Circular 230's viewpoint-based requirements include obligations
regarding the method of analysis, conclusions that must be reached, and
disclosures that must be made. 333 As a general proposition, the First
Amendment subjects viewpoint-based restrictions to a heightened level
of scrutiny.3 34 However, such restrictions are not per se invalid under the
329. Arguably, lawyers who offer confidential tax strategies or charge fees contingent on tax
benefits have a greater duty to analyze the entire transaction. Assuming that is the case, a better
approach would be to limit practitioners' ability to impose confidentiality restrictions or charge
contingent fees. Proposed revisions to Circular 230 would do that for contingent fees. 71 Fed. Reg.
6421 (Feb. 8, 2006).
330. See supra notes 82, 92-94.
331. See supra note 122.
332. See, e.g., Green, supra note 201, at 1702 ("Respect for the system is jeopardized if rules
of practice ban advising about positions that in other contexts may be legitimately advocated and
that in some cases ... may be attempted by taxpayers without exposure of penalty to them.").
333. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)-(d) (2006).
334. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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professional speech model described above. 335 Instead, under the profes-
sional speech model, each viewpoint-based requirement must be evalu-
ated based on the policy goal that the requirement is intended to serve;
whether the requirement is narrowly tailored to its objective; and whether
it distorts the usual functioning of the profession, prevents the exercise of
professional judgment, or requires a professional to make false or mis-
336leading statements.
1. Requirements Regarding Method of Analysis
Section 10.35 imposes two principal restrictions on the analysis in a
covered opinion. The first is that the opinion may not contain internally
inconsistent legal analyses or conclusions.337 As discussed above,338 the
principle difficulty with this requirement is the uncertainty regarding its
scope,339 since it is frequently not clear whether two analyses or conclu-
sions are inconsistent. It is difficult to identify the policy goals served by
preventing a lawyer from seeking to distinguish the meanings given to
the same term in different provisions of the Code or addressing alterna-
tive analyses, and prohibiting this analysis would interfere with the prac-
titioner's obligation to provide a client with a complete assessment of the
possible outcomes and with a lawyer's fundamental role in interpreting
the law.34°
The second principal restriction is that, in evaluating a tax issue, a
practitioner may not take into account the possibilities that the IRS may
not audit a tax return or raise an issue, or that the issue will be resolved
by settlement if raised.34' Section 10.37 imposes this second restriction
on written advice that is not a covered opinion.342 As discussed above,
prohibiting a lawyer from taking the audit lottery into account is a non-
controversial restatement of existing ethics rules.3 4 3 On the other hand,
335. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883-84 (1992) (upholding
required disclosures by physicians providing abortions).
336. See supra notes 292-97 and accompanying text.
337. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(2)(iii) (2006).
338. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
339. If an opinion contains literally opposite analyses, one is plainly wrong; accordingly, the
practitioner is not competent. Section 10.51(1) defines incompetent and disreputable conduct for
which a practitioner may be sanctioned as including the giving of a false opinion, knowingly, reck-
lessly, or through gross incompetence, including an opinion which is intentionally or recklessly
misleading.
340. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 327 (1998) (discussing conflicts between criminal law and the professional role of protecting
public's legal rights).
341. Circular 230,31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(iii) (2006).
342. Id. § 10.37(a).
343. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. But see Blattmachr et al., supra note 84,
at 75 n.76 (arguing that a rule prohibiting a practitioner from referring to the possibility that return
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prohibiting a lawyer from analyzing the likely responses of the IRS to a
position identified on audit interferes with a lawyer's role.
The vast majority of tax disputes are resolved at the administrative
level, where the identification, evaluation and resolution of issues is gen-
erally faster and less costly, and Congress has expressed a general policy
favoring resolution of tax disputes outside the courts.344 The IRS, through
revenue procedures and other pronouncements, regularly provides chan-
nels for resolving specific issues outside the courts. In those cases, ad-
vice that fails to take into account the expected position of the IRS would
be incomplete.34 5 Even if there is no specific administrative channel for
resolving an issue, administrative pronouncements are treated as author-
ity for purposes of defining acceptable tax return positions, not merely
because of the persuasiveness of pronouncement or the likelihood that a
court may give deference to the positions, but precisely because they rep-
resent the view of the IRS and are thought to predict the position that the
IRS will take in similar cases. Because predictions of IRS positions can
be an important element in identifying a taxpayer's rights, a rule that
prohibits predictions can significantly distort a lawyer's role and prevent
the exercise of professional judgment.
2. Required Level of Confidence Regarding Conclusions
Unless an opinion is a marketed opinion, Section 10.35 does not
impose minimum levels of confidence. However, an opinion that fails to
express a favorable conclusion on a significant federal tax issue at a con-
fidence level of at least "more likely than not" must include a "no reli-
ance" legend.346 A marketed opinion must express a favorable conclusion
on each significant federal tax issue, and regarding the overall tax treat-
ment of the transaction, at a confidence level of at least "more likely than
not.
3 4 7
Requiring "more likely than not" conclusions in marketed opinions
is meant to prevent a practitioner from providing advice used by third
parties to encourage taxpayers to take improper positions. 348 However, as
will not be audited may raise constitutional questions because it would preclude practitioners from
giving clients accurate information).
344. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7123 (2005), which provides for non-binding mediation at the request
of a taxpayer or the IRS Office of Appeals on any issue unresolved at the conclusion of appeals
procedures or unsuccessful attempts to enter into a closing agreement.
345. A corporate tax shelter opinion that takes into account the possibility of settlement in
reaching a "more likely than not" confidence level may not be relied upon as a defense against the
penalties of Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(B). However, there is no ethical prohibition against a law-
yer's rendering such an opinion.
346. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e)(4) (2006).
347. Id. § 10,35(c)(3)(iv).
348. See supra note 129.
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discussed above,349 the rule prohibits a practitioner from providing an
opinion in circumstances where there is little reason to think that taxpay-
ers are being encouraged to take improper positions-for example, where
the rules are uncertain or in situations involving only secondary issues.
The problem of secondary issues does not arise if the practitioner renders
"negative advice" that the position will not succeed and does not indicate
a favorable view at any level of confidence. However, other professional
standards may treat such advice as incomplete or misleading if it does
not appropriately identify the taxpayer's rights.350 Also, the broad defini-
tion of a marketed tax shelter results in the rule applying in situations
where there is no improper inducement; for example, where the advice is
provided to a client regarding the client's tax treatment.
Finally, whether the "more likely than not" standard is appropriate
is a fundamental question. The ethical rules generally apply a "realistic
possibility of success" standard, which can be satisfied if there is a one-
in-three possibility of success.351 Likewise, the tax return preparer under-
statement penalty applies a "realistic possibility of success" standard.352
In the ethics context, most commentators have rejected a "more likely
than not" standard because of the inherent subjectivity of a percentage-
based standard and because such a standard unduly restricts the positions
that a taxpayer may assert on a return.
353
The minimum-level-of-confidence standards interfere in significant
ways with a lawyer's role in providing tax advice and the legitimate ex-
ercise of a lawyer's judgment. Consider three situations where a lawyer
renders tax advice: (1) advice addressed to a client and discussing the tax
treatment of the client; (2) advice addressed to a client and discussing the
tax treatment of a third party (such as a business counterparty of the cli-
ent); and (3) advice addressed to a third party and discussing the tax
treatment of the third party.
In the first situation, assume that the lawyer is rendering tax advice
to a client regarding the client's treatment in a tax shelter transaction and
that the lawyer knows the advice will be used by a promoter in marketing
the transaction to the client-for example, because the client asks the
349. See supra notes 129-30.
350. Formal Opinion 346, supra note 35, specifically requires a lawyer to "fully and fairly
address" each relevant material tax issue.
351. See supra note 161.
352. See supra notes 197, 205.
353. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text. Cf WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, §
202.3.1.2 (A "substantial authority standard is more stringent than the professional standard cur-
rently governing practitioners in recommending positions that may be taken on the taxpayer's re-
turn."); Green, supra note 201, at 1698 (a "more stringent return position standard will result in more
meritorious positions being placed beyond the pale of ethical tax advice.").
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lawyer to send a draft of the advice to the promoter for comments. In this
situation, the limits on the lawyer's ability to provide advice should be
no greater than the client's right to act on such advice.354 If the client has
the right to file a tax return (subject to any required disclosure) claiming
tax benefits from the transaction, it should not be deprived of the law-
yer's advice regarding the strength of the position, even if the lawyer
does not reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at least "more likely
than not., 355 True, the lawyer's inability to reach that level of confidence
normally will prevent the client from using it to establish a reasonable
cause and good faith defense against penalties. However, the client has a
right to assert the position on a tax return pending resolution of the rele-
vant issues and the penalties will apply only if the client's position ulti-
mately is determined to be incorrect.
356
The fact that the lawyer's advice is used by the tax shelter promoter
should not affect the foregoing analysis. It might be argued that either the
promoter or the client may press the lawyer to reach a favorable conclu-
sion on an improper transaction. However, a fundamental tenet of legal
ethics is the lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional judgment
in the face of pressure. 357 A rule based on the assumption that a lawyer
will not exercise such judgment fundamentally distorts the role of a law-
yer by preventing both good and bad lawyering. Another concern may be
that the promoter will use the lawyer's advice to encourage the client to
take a risky position-that the client will make bad choices based on the
lawyer's advice. However, this argument suffers from two flaws. First,
the lawyer generally has a duty to explain the risks.358 Second, any prob-
lem that exists is one of bad choices, not of truthful information: "It is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing infor-
mation, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us."
359
354. Cf Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) ("Whatever consti-
tutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is
derivative of the woman's position.").
355. Cf Trucksess, supra note 203, at 762-63.
356. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1983).
358. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2003) (stating that a "lawyer shall
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (stating that
a "lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the
client has been informed of relevant considerations").
359. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 770 (1976). See
also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willing-
boro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977). The government will frequently seek to justify restrictions on
speech by arguing that the speech is not in an individual's or the public's interest. Such justifications
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Now consider the second situation, in which the lawyer advises a
client about the tax treatment of a third party. Assume that the client is
the tax shelter promoter and seeks advice about the treatment of a third
party investor in the shelter, and that the lawyer knows the client will use
the advice to market the tax shelter to the third party. Further assume,
however, that the lawyer's advice is not addressed to the third party and
that the client's marketing efforts will not refer to the lawyer's advice.
Here again, the limits on the lawyer's ability to provide advice should be
no greater than the client's right to act on such advice. The lawyer will
have a duty not to knowingly participate in the development of a tax
shelter that lacks a realistic possibility of success and to advise the client
of its legal obligations in marketing the tax shelter, such as any duty to
report the tax shelter and to maintain documentation regarding the tax
shelter and the marketing efforts. However, if the client is permitted to
market the tax shelter, it cannot be deprived of legal advice regarding the
tax shelter it is marketing.
Finally, consider the third situation, in which the lawyer gives ad-
vice to a third party about the tax treatment of the third party. Assume
that the client, the tax shelter promoter, asks the lawyer to prepare advice
for a third party investor in the tax shelter regarding the investor's tax
treatment. In this case, the restrictions on the lawyer's advice operate to
restrict the client's marketing activities. Even if other marketing activi-
ties are not prohibited, regulating the lawyer's advice may be considered
important because of the perceived authority of a lawyer's advice.
This situation is more complex than the others, because it involves
First Amendment limits on the regulation of both professional speech
and commercial-type speech. The initial question is whether providing
legal advice as part of a marketing effort is an accepted part of a lawyer's
role. Lawyers representing sellers frequently will be called upon to pro-
vide advice to potential purchasers. For example, a lawyer representing a
seller of property may be called upon to provide a good-title opinion to
the purchaser, or a lawyer for an issuer of securities may be called upon
are generally referred to in First Amendment theory as "paternalism," and a First Amendment doc-
trine has developed around the rejection of such justifications. See Carpenter, supra note 2. See also
Volokh, supra note 2, at 1304 (The "premise of modem First Amendment law is that the government
generally may not (with a few narrow exceptions) punish speech because of a fear, even a justified
fear, that the people will make the wrong decisions based on that speech."). Nevertheless, the
boundary between speech that falls outside professional norms and speech that merely reflects a
professionally controversial position is often unclear. Attempts to prohibit marginal professional
views raise important First Amendment issues. See, e.g., 2002 Op. Iowa Att'y Gen. 02-12-1 (2002)
(analyzing Dental Board rule prohibiting dentists from recommending removal of restorations from
nonallergic patients for alleged purpose of removing toxic substances from body, and concluding
that Dental Board had responsibility to monitor scientific support for its position).
[Vol. 29:843
2006] Circular 230 & Regulation of Professional Speech
to provide a tax disclosure in a prospectus. Such role is specifically ad-
dressed by the ethical rules and other guidance.36 °
The ethical rules nevertheless highlight the tension that arises when
a lawyer renders an opinion at the client's request to a third party. In
those circumstances, the lawyer assumes responsibilities to the third
party as well as to the client. As stated in Formal Opinion 346, "[t]hese
third persons have an interest in the integrity of the evaluation. 36' Under
Model Rule 2.3(a), a lawyer may provide such advice if the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that providing the opinion "is compatible with other
aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client. 3 62 Where providing
the opinion is likely to have a material adverse effect on the client's in-
terests, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent before pro-
viding the opinion.
363
Under the ethical rules, the lawyer rendering an opinion to a third
party has a duty of candor and must exercise independent professional
judgment. 364 Thus, the lawyer must disclose to the third party any limita-
tion on the scope of the opinion or limitation imposed by the client.365
The lawyer must not knowingly make a false statement of material fact
or law in providing the opinion.366 However, assuming that the client and
the third party are otherwise acting within the bounds of the law, the
lawyer has no duty to evaluate whether what is being sold by the client is
appropriate for the third party's needs.
A similar analysis should apply for purposes of the First Amend-
ment. If the third party would have the right to file a tax return claiming
tax benefits based on the relative strength of the position, the lawyer
should not be prevented from providing an otherwise accurate and com-
plete opinion merely because the transaction is uncertain or risky. A rule
prohibiting the lawyer from providing the opinion could be justified only
on the ground that the third party might be persuaded to take an undue
tax risk. However, as discussed above, the "bad choices" rationale for
restricting truthful speech has been emphatically rejected by the Supreme
Court.
3 67
360. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. (2003); ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1981); Formal Opinion 346, supra note 35.
361. Formal Opinion 346, supra note 35.
362. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (2003).
363. Id. at R. 2.3(b).
364. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 2.1, R. 2.3, R. 4.1 (2003).
365. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. (2003).
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 281, 359. Dale Carpenter has noted that the antipaternalism principle is
not limited to the rejection of justifications based on the harm that may be caused to the direct re-
cipient of the speech. Rather, the principle "is hostile to attempts by the government to restrict
909
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3. Required Disclosures and Prohibition Against Contrary Advice
Section 10.35 provides for various disclosures on written advice, ei-
ther as conditions for qualifying under a specific exception from the cov-
ered opinion rules or as absolute requirements for covered opinions with
certain characteristics. In the first category are the "legending out" dis-
closures for reliance opinions 368 or marketed opinions 369 and the disclo-
sures for limited scope opinions.37 ° In the second category are the re-
quired disclosures for covered opinions that are marketed opinions 37' and
opinions (other than marketed opinions) that fail to reach a "more likely
than not" conclusion.372 If a disclosure is required under Section 10.35, a
practitioner may not provide advice that is contrary to or inconsistent
with the required disclosure.
As discussed above, the "no reliance" legend is inaccurate in a
number of respects: (1) there currently is no rule prohibiting a taxpayer
from relying on a "no reliance" opinion; (2) in the case of tax shelters
that are not reportable transactions, a non-corporate taxpayer may assert
reliance on an opinion reaching a lower level of confidence; and (3) the
"no reliance" legend is inconsistent with a taxpayer's ability to rely on an
opinion to avoid the penalties for negligence, disregard of rules or regu-
lations, and fraud.373 By requiring a lawyer to include a "no reliance"
legend in circumstances in which the written advice could in fact be re-
lied upon by the taxpayer, and by prohibiting a lawyer from providing
advice contrary to or inconsistent with the "no reliance" legend, Section
10.35 creates a significant conflict with a lawyer's ethical duties to pro-
vide competent advice and exercise independent judgment, and interferes
in significant ways with a lawyer's role. Likewise, the "consumer protec-
tion" legend is inaccurate in cases where the opinion is rendered by the
lawyer to a client and addresses the client's tax treatment.
From a First Amendment perspective, there is no sufficiently com-
pelling justification to require a lawyer to make false or misleading
statements.37 4 Rather, First Amendment case law has permitted required
disclosures by professionals only where such disclosures were "truthful
speech on the grounds that, after receiving speech, citizens will make decisions based on the speech
which in the aggregate harm the collective welfare." Carpenter, supra note 2, at 618.
368. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2006).
369. Id. § 10.35(b)(5)(ii).
370. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(a).
371. Id. § 10.35(e)(2).
372. Id. § 10.35(e)(4).
373. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
374. See Blattmachr et al., supra note 63, at 1534; Blattmachr et al., supra note 84, at 74-75
(First Amendment implications of requiring a "no reliance" legend that is inconsistent with the ap-
plicable penalty rules).
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and nonmisleading. ' ' 375 Moreover, First Amendment case law has spe-
cifically condemned restrictions on legal advocacy that effectively deny
a client access to legal advice.37 6
C. Covered Opinion Requirements Permitted
Under the Professional Speech Model
Many of the covered opinion standards appear to be derived from
the requirements for opinions used to establish a reasonable cause and
good faith defense against corporate tax shelter penalties, 377 and an ap-
parent purpose of the standards is to make clear to a taxpayer the extent
to which the taxpayer may relay on the advice for penalty defense.378
However, as discussed above, the standards for penalty-defense opinions
are not appropriate over the whole range of clients' needs for tax advice,
and imposing those standards across the board significantly distorts a
lawyer's role in many circumstances.
379
The policy objectives could be achieved far more directly by requir-
ing an opinion to state whether it is intended to be relied upon to estab-
lish a reasonable cause and good faith defense to penalties. If so, it would
be appropriate to require that the opinion comply with the standards for
penalty-defense opinions. Other advice would be subject to the general
due diligence and competency standards of Section 10.22 and Section
10.51 of Circular 230.380 Consistent with those general standards, where
a practitioner's advice purports to reach a definitive conclusion about the
tax treatment of specific facts, the practitioner could be required to (1)
identify the scope of the opinion; (2) state the purposes for which it has
been prepared; and (3) identify the persons who may rely on the opinion.
Likewise, the rules could prohibit opinions that are based on unreason-
able factual or legal assumptions, that unreasonably rely upon representa-
tions, statements, findings or agreements, or that fail to consider all rele-
vant facts that the practitioner knows or should know. The rules could
require such opinions to (1) relate the applicable law to the facts, (2)
identify and address the relevant legal issues, (3) reach conclusions re-
375. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). See also Eubanks
v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457-60 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
376. See Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001).
377. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6664-4(c)(1) (factual due diligence obligations), 1.6664-
4(f)(2)(B)(2) (relation of the law to the facts, and conclusion at a greater than 50% confidence level),
and 1.6664-4(f)(2)(B) (opinion does not take into account the possibility that a return will not be
audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be settled).
378. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 208.5.3 (discussing the 2003 proposed covered
opinion rules).
379. See supra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.
380. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, 10.51(l) (2006).
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garding such issues, and (4) where relevant to the purpose of the opinion,
state the extent to which such conclusions affect the recipient's right to
report a position on its tax return and the potential penalties if the posi-
tion is not sustained. Finally, the rules could prohibit a practitioner from
taking into account the possibility that a tax return will not be audited, or
that a position will not be discovered in an audit. However, the practitio-
ner could take into account the possibilities that an issue would not be
raised once detected by the IRS, or would be resolved at the administra-
tive level.
Special standards would continue to apply to marketed tax shelter
opinions, defined as opinions addressed to third parties and used by a tax
shelter promoter for marketing purposes (including tax disclosures and
materials that will be referred to in marketing efforts). Consistent with
Formal Opinion 346 and the consumer protection concerns associated
with marketed tax shelter opinions, the rules could require a full-fledged
opinion along the lines of the covered opinion requirements of Section
10.35. The principal differences between present Section 10.35 and the
suggested revisions relate to the scope of the issues that the opinion must
consider, the permissible analytical methods, the required level of confi-
dence for conclusions, and the content of the required disclosures. The
rules would require such a marketed opinion to address all federal tax
issues (1) that could have a significant impact on the overall tax treat-
ment of the transaction, and (2) for which there is a reasonable possibil-
ity of challenge by the IRS. The opinion would not have to address every
tax issue for which the IRS has a reasonable basis for a successful chal-
lenge. The opinion would have to conclude that all the tax benefits being
promoted have a realistic possibility of being sustained if challenged by
the IRS. However, to the extent that a taxpayer would have a right to as-
sert the benefits on a tax return and the promoter would have a right to
market the transaction, the opinion would not have to conclude that the
taxpayer is "more likely than not" to succeed if such benefits are chal-
lenged. Finally, the opinion would have to (1) address the potential pen-
alties if the benefits are successfully challenged; (2) address the extent to
which a taxpayer may rely upon the opinion as a defense against such
penalties; (3) state that it was written to support the marketing of the
transaction, and that the taxpayer should seek independent tax advice;
and (4) disclose the existence of any compensation or referral arrange-
ment between the promoter and the practitioner.
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D. Covered Opinion Requirements for
Marketed Tax Shelter Opinions Permitted
Under the "Hearer-Centered" Theory
In certain respects the Circular 230 requirements for tax opinions
used to market tax shelters can be compared to the requirements for secu-
rities offering materials. Securities offering materials can be seen as a
form of commercial speech, and it may be appropriate to consider tax
shelter opinions used for marketing purposes in a similar light.381
As discussed above, the purpose of the "hearer-centered" First
Amendment theory is to ensure that the recipient of commercial-type
speech receives information that enhances his or her ability to make an
informed and autonomous choice. 382 Under such a theory, the govern-
ment can prohibit false or misleading speech, or speech that promotes an
unlawful choice, and can require inclusion of information that helps the
recipient make an informed choice. However, absent a compelling need
and narrowly tailored measures, the government cannot prohibit the
communication of truthful, non-misleading information, regardless of the
risk that the recipient will use the information to make an undesirable
choice. Further, the government cannot impose inaccurate prophylactic
rules.
Application of the "hearer-centered" theory to the Circular 230 re-
strictions on marketed tax shelter opinions results in a somewhat differ-
ent analysis than under the professional speech model. However, the ul-
timate conclusions are largely the same. Consider first the requirement
that a lawyer address each significant issue for which the IRS has a "rea-
sonable basis" for a successful challenge. Under a "hearer-centered" the-
ory, such a requirement will be evaluated principally on whether it pro-
motes an informed and autonomous choice by the recipient. That, in turn,
depends on whether the use of a "reasonable basis" standard, rather than
the "reasonable possibility of challenge" standard under the professional
rules, furthers or hinders the recipient's informed choice. Because the
"reasonable basis" standard is more comprehensive and objective than
the "reasonable possibility of challenge" standard, a court is likely to
conclude that the "reasonable basis" standard furthers, or at least does
not materially hinder, the recipient's informed decision making.383 The
burden would be on the challenger to establish that the "reasonable ba-
381. See, generally, Bevier, supra note 2; Boyer, supra note 2; Dooley, supra note 2; Neub-
ome, supra note 2; Pinto, supra note 2; Schoeman, supra note 2; Wolfson, supra note 2.
382. See supra note 303.
383. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 650-53 (1985) (upholding requirement that advertisement of contingent legal fee arrangement
disclose the possibility that clients will have to pay costs in unsuccessful lawsuits).
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sis" requirement prevents an informed choice; for example, by submerg-
ing important risks in speculative ones, deterring lawyers from providing
important advice out of a fear of the consequences of failing to identify
384an issue, or making legal advice prohibitively expensive.
Second, consider the prohibition against a lawyer's taking into ac-
count the possibility that a tax return will not be audited, that an issue
will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be resolved through set-
tlement if raised.38 5 A professional speech model would allow rules pro-
hibiting a lawyer from taking into account the likelihood of detection, but
would strike down rules prohibiting a lawyer from taking into account
the likely responses of the IRS after the issue has been identified in an
audit. A "hearer-centered" theory would reach the same result for differ-
ent reasons. Advice that takes into account the possibility of non-
detection strongly implies that the conclusions cannot sustain close ex-
amination and therefore are false or misleading. On the other hand,
analysis of the likely responses of the IRS after the issue has been identi-
fied in an audit is clearly relevant to an informed choice by the recipient
whether to take the risk that the matter will be challenged by the IRS and
will not be resolved at the administrative level.
Third, consider the requirement that the opinion reach a favorable
conclusion on each significant tax issue at a confidence level of at least
"more likely than not., 38 6 As discussed above, such a requirement pro-
hibits advice reaching a favorable conclusion at a lower level of confi-
dence, regardless of whether the taxpayer has a right to claim the uncer-
tain position on a tax return. 387 The prohibition against advice at a lower
level of confidence is a prophylactic rule that treats the lower-
confidence-level conclusions as inherently invalid, or as encouraging bad
choices. The professional speech theory would find problems with this
rule based on a lawyer's duties to a client; a "hearer-centered" theory
would not allow the prohibition against lower-confidence-level conclu-
sions, both because the advice may well be correct, and because of the
paternalistic effect of the prohibition.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent surge in illegitimate tax shelters is undeniably a problem
for the tax system. Moreover, the behavior of certain professionals in
developing, promoting and executing highly abusive tax shelters is de-
plorable. However, the Circular 230 requirements for covered opinions
384. See Pinto, supra note 2, at 94.
385. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(iii) (2006).
386. Id. § 10.35(c)(3)(ii).
387. See supra notes 201-03, 351-56, and accompanying text.
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are in many respects an inappropriate response to these problems. The
requirements effectively impose a framework and prohibitions on advice
in ways that prevent a lawyer from giving taxpayers a complete, in-
formed assessment of their rights. In certain circumstances the rules cre-
ate significant ethical conflicts and deny the public legal advice. More
generally, they distort the lawyer's role and erode the principles underly-
ing legal ethics rules. This restriction of information and distortion of a
lawyer's role make the rules vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge
under the doctrines of professional speech and, in the case of tax opin-
ions used to market tax shelters to third parties, under a general "hearer-
centered" First Amendment theory.
